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INTRODUCTION 
Economic situation and 
economic reform in 
Central and Eastern Europe 
Stabilization and liberalization have been largely completed in all the CEECs. Never-
theless macroeconomic policy continues to be dominated by the need to control inflation 
and, in those countries faced with fiscal crisis, by the need to reduce budget deficits. 
The fall in output of recent years has begun to bottom out, and some countries experi-
enced growth in 1993, notably Poland, whose GDP rose by 4.5%. Most countries saw 
a slight improvement in their external accounts in 1993, but the trade balance deterio-
rated acutely in Hungary and Poland, and less sharply in Bulgaria and Slovenia. 
Between 1989 and 1993 the weighted average decline in the CEECs' GDP was perhaps 
about one quarter and in industrial production about one third. 
The fall in output has inevitably had adverse effects on individuals, in the form of falling 
real incomes. At the same time people have seen their savings eroded by inflation, and 
open unemployment, almost unknown under central planning, has risen steeply in most 
countries. Furthermore, the wider dispersion of incomes that has resulted from increas-
ingly decentralized market-based decision-making has prompted resentment among 
those who have seen their relative position deteriorate. 
All these effects have caused perceptions of the transition to become more negative. The 
high hopes of four years ago are giving way to despondency, frustration and political 
apathy. This makes it all the more important to ensure that these economies achieve rap-
id and sustainable growth. 
The decline in output that accompanied the initial stages of refonn has been arrested 
and reversed, but the prospects for strong growth a re not good. Most of these economies 
are hampered by weak investment and by an external constraint. 
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The most disturbing aspect of the decline in output has been 
the steep fall in investment. If the CEECs are to achieve econ-
omic performance that allows them to begin to catch up with 
Western Europe, they will need much new investment, both 
to modernize infrastructure and to transform productive ca-
pacity. Several factors explain the very negative trend in in-
vestment: fiscal pressure has forced cuts in government 
spending, and these have fallen hardest on capital spending; 
inadequacies of the financial sector have meant a shortage of 
investment credit and high interest rates; and uncertainty has 
been generated by a variety of factors, including delays in 
economic recovery, slow progress in privatizing and restruc-
turing enterprises, the lack of a sufficiently stable and effec-
tive framework for private sector initiative, and impediments 
to trade. 
Furthermore, high rates of investment growth would prob-
ably lead to unsustainable external deficits within a short 
time, if it is assumed that roughly a quarter of new investment 
needs to be imported. Some CEECs, notably Hungary and 
Poland, are already running trade deficits that are close to the 
limit of what they are able to finance. This means that either 
exports will have to grow faster or import growth will have 
to decelerate substantially. Unless slower import growth is ac-
companied by a shift in the composition of imports from con-
sumer goods to capital goods, fewer capital goods will be im-
ported and consequently future growth prospects will be 
curbed. 
The prospects for East European exports are uncertain. Export 
volumes, after the remarkable gains of 1991 and 1992, fell 
significantly in 1993. Several factors may explain this. East-
ern Europe's main market, the EU and particularly Germany, 
has been in recession. Eastern price competitiveness has been 
much eroded by a sizeable real appreciation of exchange rates, 
which has dampened inflation but also exports. It may be that 
trade with the West has reached a temporary plateau: there is 
a lack of supply of exportable goods, which will last until new 
investments in new export products come on stream. 
To alleviate the constraints on growth the CEECs will need 
to mobilize domestic savings, curb fiscal deficits, attract 
larger flows of foreign direct investment and expand their ex-
ports. 
In several countries a substantial part of domestic savings is 
having to go to finance budget deficits, and everywhere do-
mestic financial intermediation is unequal to the task of chan-
nelling savings efficiently. In all CEECs improved tax admin-
istration would help boost revenues, and those countries that 
have fiscal problems should make further efforts to control 
expenditure. 
The fragility of the financial sector throughout the region is 
extremely worrying: at a minimum it is preventing the market 
from operating properly. Action is needed to ensure that the 
financial sector, which for the time being means the banks, 
fulfil their key role of allocating credit and controlling enter -
prises. A definitive solution has to be found to the problem 
of bad loans, and banks must enforce financial discipline. 
Most CEECs have established an institutional framework ap-
propriate to a market economy, but to attract more foreign in-
vestment they will need to ensure that legislation is implem-
ented effectively and consistently. Restructuring and 
privatization of industry will enable the CEECs to exploit 
their comparative advantages and so to expand exports. 
The CEECs are benefiting less than they could from the free 
trade arrangements that they have with the EU and with 
EFTA, because these arrangements are bilateral and trade 
barriers between the CEECs remain. This not only restrains 
trade but also discourages investment: investors planning 
facilities from which to supply the region will tend to locate 
them in an EU or EFTA country, from which they can bene-
fit from free trade throughout the EU, EFTA and the 
CEECs. 
Albania 
Albania is predominantly an agricultural economy, with 
about 65% of the work-force engaged in farming. The 
country's small industrial sector produces mostly basic con-
sumer goods. Albania also produces energy and has relatively 
important chrome and copper mines. Already before the col-
lapse of the communist regime the level of economic devel-
opment was the lowest in Europe; the political events of 1990 
and 1991 resulted in an immediate and deep economic col-
lapse. 
During 1992-93 the authorities implemented a series of 
measures aimed at addressing major problems in the econ-
omy. A floating exchange rate was adopted on 1 July 1992 
and is determined freely within a unified market. The lek has 
gradually stabilized against the dollar since the autumn of 
1992, while gross official reserves, excluding gold, rose to 
$168m in June 1994, as a result of higher than projected pri-
vate transfers and capital inflows. Interest rates were raised 
substantially, and real rates have now become positive, 
though they continue to be set administratively because of the 
lack of banking competition. Individual bank credit ceilings 
were adopted, and a system of reserve requirements for all 
banks was introduced. A new bankruptcy law took effect on 
l January 1993, but the authorities have initiated liquidation 
proceedings against only three enterprises to date. An unem-
ployment benefit system was introduced, and a new and less 
generous social safety net has been created. 
All wholesale and retail prices have been freed, with the ex-
ception of wheat, bread, home heating fuels and a number of 
non-food items produced under monopolistic conditions 
(rents, medicines, telecommunications, urban transport, etc.). 
For these items, a new series of price rises was implemented 
in mid-1993, which included the doubling of the prices of 
wheat, flour and bread and two-to-threefold increases in 
public housing rents and household energy. In an effort to 
cushion the social impact of this measure the government de-
signed a large compensation scheme, which is being phased 
out in the course of 1994. 
To contain the general government budget deficit, which re-
ached 22% of GDP in 1992, strict targets for the domestic fi-
nancing of the deficit have been set. The authorities have 
sought to diversify the sources of tax revenues, which used to 
be virtually all drawn from the ailing enterprise sector. The 
main revenue sources are a surcharge on customs duties, a 
new turnover tax and a profit tax, which were put in place in 
early 1992. A personal income tax was introduced in 
mid-1992. However, the large number of tax holidays and 
exemptions has complicated the task of tax administration 
and eroded the tax base. Expenditures rose substantially in the 
second half of 1993 because of increased investment (albeit 
from artificially low levels) and social safety net expendi-
tures. The budget deficit was reduced to about 16% of GDP 
in 1993, of which about 10% was financed domestically. Pri-
vate sector contributions will make up 37% of 1994 revenues, 
up from 26% in 1993. 
After the catastrophe of 1990-91, Albania's economic situ-
ation began to improve in 1992 and the positive trend was 
maintained in 1993. GDP rose by 11 % in 1993, but still re-
mains about 30% below its pre-crisis level. The main engine 
of recovery has been agriculture, which has responded fa-
vourably to price reform and privatization, with output re-
covering by 18% in 1992 and an estimated 14.4% in 1993. 
Following the near-collapse of I 992 (--60% ), industrial out-
put shrank by a further 10% in I 993; enterprises continued to 
close or to operate far below capacity. Inflation declined in 
1993, except during the third quarter when there was a surge 
following the increases in administered prices, and continued 
to fall during the first half of I 994. Exports rose by 50% in 
1993, although they still remain at very low absolute levels 
compared to the central planning era, while most imports 
were financed through foreign aid. The rapid rise of imports 
decelerated in 1993 ( + 11 % over 1992), as the country's food 
production continued to grow. Initial trade data for the first 
half of 1994 point to a continuing rise of exports and a stabil-
ization of imports. However, as exports are much smaller than 
imports, the trade account continues to be in deficit. 
TABLE I : ALBANIA - Main Economic Indicators 
Area ('000 km2) 27.5 
Population (millions) 3.4 
Population density (per sq km) 124 
1992 1993 1994 
GDP at constant prices (a) -9.7 l 1.0 
Agricultural production (aJ 18.0 14.4 
Industrial production (a) -60.0 -10.0 
Consumer price index (a) 226.0 85.0 
Unemployment rate, in % (b) 18.0 14.0 
Budget balance. % GDP (c) -21.8 -16.0 
Trade balance, $ bn (d) -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 
Current account, $ bn (d) -0.4 -0.4 -0.l 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (b) 0.70 0.83 
Debt-export ratio, % (c) 994 794 
(a) Percentage change over (the same period of) the previous year. 
(b) End of period. 
( e) Consolidated state of budget deficit. accrual basis. 
(d) Jn convertible currencies. 
latest 
Apr 
Jan-June 
Jan-June 
( e) Gross hard-currency debt as a percentage of hard-currency exports. 
Following the completion of the stand-by arrangement with 
the IMF for I 992-93, the government reached agreement with 
the Fund on a new programme, which is being supported by 
a three-year arrangement under the enhanced structural ad-
justment facility (ESAF) for an amount of SDR 42.4m. The 
principal macroeconomic objectives of the programme are 
real GDP growth of 3-4% during I 993-94; reduction of an-
nual inflation to 33% by mid- I 994, which has been attained 
if the one-off effect of energy price liberalization is excluded, 
and a further strengthening of the external position, including 
the building up of official reserves to three months' imports 
by mid-1994, which was nearly achieved. Interest rates will 
be kept at positive levels; real state-sector wages will be main-
tained at around present levels; and price reform will be con-
tinued. Fiscal adjustment remains a central element of the 
programme; in view of the expected decline of food aid 
counterpart revenues and the need to attend to a number of 
critical expenditure needs that can no longer be deferred (in-
cluding investment and structural reforms), the commitment 
to reduce the domestic financing of the budget to 7% of GDP 
will constitute a major challenge. The I 994 budget passed by 
Parliament in March implies a deficit of about 19% of GDP, 
including financing from external sources. 
A further government objective is to normalize relations with 
the country's external creditors. New credit from foreign com-
mercial banks is unlikely to be forthcoming, as Albania is 
confronted with a huge outstanding external debt, of 
US$834m (74% of GDP) at end-1993, of which US$62lm 
is due in the f01m of arrears on short-term credits with some 
thirty European commercial banks. The Bank of Albania has 
asked for a debt rescheduling, and contacts with commercial 
banks resumed in late 1993. The Bank would like to negotiate 
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a buy-back of commercial arrears at a substantial discount, 
with the support of the IDA debt reduction facility. 
The privatization process has so far centred primarily on small 
and medium-sized units in trade and services, as well as on 
state farms and agricultural co-operatives. All state retail and 
service shops have been privatized, usually through direct 
sales to employees. In agriculture, 93% of former co-operat-
ive farms, which constitute about 75% of arable land, have 
been privatized. State farms occupy the remaining 25% of the 
land; the government has distributed 9 I% of this land to pri-
vate tenants. However, the vast majority of arable land is cur-
rently occupied by subsistence-oriented small farms, which 
will constrain growth of agricultural output in the future. A 
large number of small and medium-sized industrial enter -
prises are in the process of being privatized by auction. How-
ever, the country's weak legal and institutional framework has 
hampered efforts to privatize large enterprises. There are long-
standing plans to sell about 300 medium-sized and large com-
panies through mass privatization using a voucher scheme. A 
number of these companies have since been reclassified as 
small or medium-sized enterprises because of a reduction in 
the number of workers employed or because stocks have been 
rendered worthless and subsequently excluded from the en-
terprises' book value; these will therefore be privatized by 
auction. The authorities have begun to print the vouchers 
which will be used in the mass privatization scheme. There 
will be no attempt to restructure these enterprises before pri-
vatization. 
Most large enterprises are operating at low levels of output 
and will find it impossible to continue to operate without 
budgetary support, as their capital stock is obsolete, the do-
mestic market is small and impoverished and there is no tradi-
tion or experience of export-oriented production and market-
ing. The government has identified 32 key enterprises whose 
situation is particularly sensitive, since they are large 
employers, and has created an agency charged with restructur-
ing, privatizing or closing them over the next few years. These 
companies will continue to receive budgetary support during 
restructuring. About 60-70 strategic groups, nearly all of 
which are involved in the production of oil and minerals, are 
to be privatized eventually, but only after they have been re-
structured with foreign technical assistance. 
A two-tier banking system was introduced in mid- I 992, with 
all commercial banks being allowed to operate as universal 
banks, taking deposits and lending to households and enter-
prises. Yet the commercial banking sector has developed very 
slowly, mostly because of the lack of uniform legal standards 
for accounting and auditing, poor reporting procedures, an in-
adequate payments system and lack of experience with mod-
em banking techniques. The sector has continued to be char-
acterized by market segmentation and specialization. Foreign 
banks, which could provide an impetus for the modernization 
of the banking sector, have been slow to arrive; only two 
foreign banks had begun operations as joint ventures by 
end- I 993. There exist no domestic private banks to date. 
The structural transformation of the Albanian economy en-
tails the enactment of legislation and the setting up of institu-
tions which will regulate private economic activity as well as 
modernize the foreign and domestic trading systems and 
create a modem financial system. In view of the very weak 
enterprise sector and the extremely limited outside contacts 
that Albania had before 1991, it has a particular need for 
foreign investment. The foreign investment law which was 
passed in October 1993 strengthens the legal guarantees avail-
able to foreign capital, but foreigners are still not allowed to 
own land in Albania; they may lea'ie it for 99 years. Total 
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foreign investment so far has amounted to $235m, most of 
which is for joint ventures. 
Bulgaria 
Economic reform and restructuring continue to make only 
slow progress in Bulgaria. In 1993, GDP fell by an estimated 
5%. This followed declines of 9%, 12%, and 6% in 1990, 
1991 and 1992 respectively. Unemployment rose to over 16% 
of the labour force by mid-1993, before stabilizing at this 
level. Recent months have seen an improvement in the fig-
ures: in June of this year there were some 80,000 fewer regis-
tered than in June 1993, which brought the rate below 14%. 
However, this is likely to be as much a reflection of lack of 
progress in reforming state enterprises as a sign of economic 
recovery. 
The legacy of central planning included an excessively devel-
oped heavy industrial sector, based in part on artificially cheap 
energy from the Soviet Union, and lax regulation of pollution. 
Since 1990, the country has also suffered a number of serious 
external shocks. The collapse of trade with the CMEA hit 
Bulgaria particularly hard. To this were added the effects of 
international embargoes on Iraq and Serbia, and the lack of 
access to commercial credit as a result of the unilateral mora-
torium on external debt declared in March 1990. 
Despite these difficulties, substantial progress has been made 
in many areas. The passage in July 1994 of the long-awaited 
bankruptcy law means that the basic legal framework necess-
ary for a functioning market economy is now in place. Prices 
have been largely liberalized, and the currency is convertible 
for current account purposes. Foreign trade has been re-
oriented towards western markets, despite the considerable 
difficulties caused by UN sanctions against Serbia-Montene-
gro, which effectively close Bulgaria's main transit routes to 
the West. In these circumstances, the dollar value of exports 
stagnated in 1993, while imports increased by over 10%. This 
resulted in a trade deficit of US$700 million. 
TABLE 2: BULGARIA- Main Economic Indicators 
Area ('OOO km2) 112.5 
Population (millions) 8.5 
Population density (per sq km) 76 
1992 1993 1994 
GDP at constant prices (a) -5.7 -4.2 
Agricultural production (a) -7.7 -9 
Industrial production (a) -7.0 -8.5 -4.8 
Consumer price index (a) 91.1 72.8 77.4 
Unemployment rate, in % (b) 15.6 15.9 13.4 
Budget balance, % GDP (c) -14.0 -15.1 
Trade balance, $ bn (d) 0.0 -0.7 0.0 
Current account, $ bn (d),(t) -0.4 -0.9 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (b) 14.2 14.7 
Debt-export ratio, % (e) 405 404 
(a) Percentage change over (the same period of) the previous year. 
(b) End of period. 
(c) Consolidated state budget deficit, accrual basis. 
( d) Due basis. 
latest 
Jan-May 
Jan-June 
June 
Jan-Mar 
(e) Gross hard-currency debt as a percentage of hard-currency exports. 
(f) In convertible currencies. 
Restitution of urban property has helped the emergence of a 
dynamic private services sector, with well over half of retail 
trade in private hands. Overall, the private sector is estimated 
to have generated over one-third of GDP in 1993. Agricul-
tural land restitution has advanced more slowly, as validating 
claims and precisely determining land boundaries has proved 
to be a painstaking process. By end-1993, 44% of land had 
been definitively restored to private owners, and an additional 
25% was in private hands on temporary title. The private sec-
tor is estimated to have accounted for almost 60% of agricul-
ture's contribution to GDP in 1993. However, many of the re-
stored plots are very small. The development of private 
agriculture has also been impeded by failure to make greater 
progress in restructuring the food-processing industries. Agri-
culture in general has suffered the effects of severe drought in 
1992 and 1993. 
In 1993 and 1994 Bulgaria has seen improvements in its rela-
tions with the international community. In late 1993, Bulgaria 
reached agreement with the IMF on an economic programme 
for 1994 that could be supported by a one year stand-by ar-
rangement ( a previous arrangement had run off track in late 
1992). By mid-1994, the programme was still broadly on 
target. 
In June 1994, Bulgaria and its foreign commercial creditors 
signed a debt and debt-service reduction agreement (DDSR). 
Overall, the agreement reduces Bulgaria's US$8.2 billion 
debt to western commercial banks by an estimated 47%. 
Under the terms of the deal, Bulgaria is required to make up-
front payments of US$750 million, while interest payments 
are expected to amount to about US$250-270 million per 
annum in the next seven years. Much of the initial cost will 
be met by loans from the international financial institutions, 
the European Union and the G-24. The completion of the 
agreement restores normal relations between Bulgaria and the 
international financial community, and should improve the 
flow of foreign investment to the country. 
The major challenge facing reform in Bulgaria is the prob-
lems of the financial and enterprise sectors. Although good 
progress was made initially in transforming state enterprises 
into joint-stock companies, this was not followed up by the 
development of something approaching a normal commercial 
environment. State-owned commercial banks, already bur-
dened with non-performing loans from the period of central 
planning, continued lending to insolvent state enterprises. A 
number of factors help to explain this behaviour. First, bank-
ruptcy legislation was inadequate, making it difficult for 
creditors to pursue their debtors. Second, banks feared that 
pursuing indebted state enterprises would expose the fragile 
nature of their own assets. Third, there was an expectation on 
the part of both enterprises and banks that the state would ulti-
mately bail out both sides. To an extent, this is what hap-
pened, as in late 1990 parliament passed a law transferring 
non-performing loans pre-dating reform from the banks to the 
state. This law does, however, appear to have had a positive 
effect on the behaviour of the banks, as they believe that the 
state will not intervene to clear their books again. Faced with 
an absence of soft credit from the banking sector, state enter-
prises have run up sizeable arrears - to their employees, to 
each other, and to the state budget. 
The enterprise sector has been further weakened by the slow 
pace of privatization. By early 1994, barely I 00 enterprises 
had been privatized. To try to accelerate the process, parlia-
ment has recently adopted legislation to facilitate mass pri-
vatization. The first round of mass privatization, covering 340 
state enterprises, is intended to be completed by the end of this 
year. Responsibility for privatization is divided among local 
authorities, the Privatization Agency, and branch ministries, 
with nobody clearly in charge. Faced with this situation, state 
enterprise managers have taken matters into their own hands. 
"Spontaneous" or "profits privatization" is believed to be 
widespread. This is a practice whereby managers of state en-
terprises enter into unfavourable buying and selling contracts 
with private enterprises in which they have an interest. Al-
though firm figures on the extent of this activity are not avail-
able, some indication of its size may be gleaned from the fact 
that for 1993 losses of the state enterprise sector are reported 
at 20% of GDP. 
The deteriorating performance of the state enterprise sector 
has had repercussions on the state budget, as enterprise profit 
taxes were one of the main sources of revenue. Tax reform and 
tax administration have been unable to keep pace with these 
developments. Although subsidies have been cut, from 15% 
of GDP in 1990 to 4% in 1993, the erosion of the tax base 
coupled with the increasing cost of interest payments on do-
mestic debt caused the cash budget deficit to reach 13% of 
GDP in 1993. The 1994 budget included a planned deficit of 
6.5% of GDP. Indications are that the budget remained on 
course during the first half of the year, with revenues a little 
higher than programmed - probably boosted by the higher 
than forecast price increase - and expenditures slightly lower 
than their budgeted levels. However, the government delayed 
adjusting wages and social welfare payments to compensate 
for inflation until July. 
The large budget deficit has contributed to keeping inflation 
at a level of 4 to 6% per month since mid-1992. A combina-
tion of the introduction of VAT on 1 April and a sudden sharp 
depreciation of the currency ( which may in part have been due 
to an import surge to avoid VAT) caused monthly inflation to 
rise to 8% in March, and then to jump to over 20% in April. 
A further increase in prices of 8% in May meant that the full-
year target of 45% inflation was passed in just the first five 
months of the year. In June, prices rose by just over 4%, which 
suggests that the risk of an inflationary spiral has been av-
erted. 
Bulgaria's DDSR may have played a part in the decline in the 
lev, which has lost some 40% of its value against the dollar 
since the deal was announced in November 1993. Although 
most of the initial costs of the agreement will be met by loans, 
the payments will still leave the National Bank's reserves 
somewhat depleted. Because of this constraint, the National 
Bank has been unable for some months past to intervene di-
rectly against speculative attacks on the currency, resorting in-
stead to an increase in interest rates. Most recently, in an effort 
to bear down on inflation, the Bank has increased minimum 
reserve requirements for commercial banks from 8 to 10 per 
cent. 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
Russia 
Russia's bleak economic record of recent years is showing 
some signs of improvement, but the overall situation remains 
difficult, and prospects are highly uncertain. Attempts to get 
inflation under control have been pursued more consistently 
in recent months, and have met with some tenuous success. 
The trade balance is in surplus. The exchange rate is appre-
ciating in real terms. The private sector and service industries 
now account for substantial shares of total activity. Yet, output 
continues to fall sharply. Investment has been hit particularly 
hard. The fiscal situation is extremely fragile, with weak re-
venues and high pressures on spending, which calls into ques-
tion the prospect of further decreases in inflation. Enterprise 
restructuring is still in its very early stages. Legislative and in-
stitutional reform remain patchy. 
The inherent difficulties of economic transition have been ex-
acerbated by a serious lack of political consensus. From the 
start of reform there were several competing centres of power: 
the president and his entourage, the government and the fac-
tions within it, Parliament, the central bank, the representa-
tives of large state enterprises. Also, many local and regional 
authorities set their policies independently, choosing a slower 
or faster pace of reform than the central government, or em-
phasizing different elements. 
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TABLE 3: RUSSIA - Main Economic Indicators 
Area ('000 km2) 17075 
Population (millions) 148.7 
Population density (per sq km) 9 
1992 1993 1994 
GDP at constant prices (a) -19.0 -12 -17 
Agricultural production (a) -9.0 -5.0 -4.5 
Industrial production (a) -18.8 -16.0 -25.8 
Consumer price index (a) 1534 877 552 
Unemployment rate, in % (b) 1.0 1.4 1.6 
Budget balance, o/r GDP (c) -4.7 -6.8 -10.4 
Trade balance, $ bn (d) 5.9 15.8 5.2 
Current account, $ bn (d) -4.2 6.7 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (b,e) 77.7 83.5 
Debt-export ratio, % (e,f) 174 184 
(a) Percentage change over (the same period of) the previous year. 
(b) End of period. 
latest 
Jan-June 
Jan-Mar 
Jan-June 
Jan-June 
June 
Jan-June 
Jan-Mar 
(c) Rouble cash flow budget including local authorities. but excluding 
off-budget operations. Including off-budget operations. 
the 1992 deficit was estimated at 20% of GDP. 
(d) Includes both FSU and non-FSU transactions. 
(e) Assuming Russia takes over 100% of ex-USSR debt. 
(f) Gross debt as a percentage of exports, both excluding FSU transactions. 
The initial reform programme, started in January 1992, aimed 
at rapid macroeconomic stabilization and profound structural 
change. Fiscal and monetary policies were set to be extremely 
tight, with drastic spending cuts and an overhaul of the tax 
system. Central price controls were lifted for most products. 
The system of multiple exchange rates was abolished in 
mid-1992, and replaced by a single rate determined at regular 
inter-bank auctions. But substantial slippage started as early 
as the spring of 1992, when the government proved unable to 
resist pressures to increase producer and consumer subsidies. 
On top of this, the central bank continued to provide credit to 
enterprises in very large quantities and at sharply negative real 
interest rates. Massive import subsidies were a severe drain 
on government finances. Large export credits to other former 
Soviet states added further to inflation. Fiscal policy has been 
hampered by disagreements between the central authorities 
and local governments over tax revenue sharing, with increas-
ing shares being retained at local level, sometimes by unilat-
eral decision. The result of these macroeconomic disequili-
bria was that inflation, after the price level adjustment in 
January 1992, remained very high - generally in the range of 
2~25% per month - throughout most of 1992/1993. 
In April 1993 a referendum provided unexpectedly large 
public support for President Yeltsin's reform strategy. Shortly 
afterwards, agreement was reached between the government 
and the central bank-which had been at loggerheads over fi-
nancial policy until then - to reduce credit emission, increase 
interest rates, and limit the budget deficit, so as to bring down 
inflation. Monetary policy was tightened; the Central Bank fi-
nance rate was raised in steps from 100% to 210% (actually 
some 590% if correct compounding rules are observed). This 
was much closer to the rate of inflation, and the measure had 
its most notable effect on the exchange rate: its steep fall was 
arrested and it has in fact gradually appreciated in real terms 
since mid-1993. The government also reduced grain sub-
sidies, formally freed coal prices and cut import subsidies. 
Taxes on oil and natural gas - which were priced at about 20% 
and 5% respectively of world market levels - were increased. 
In subsequent months, some increase in fiscal restraint and a 
sharp cut in trade credit for other CIS states indeed brought 
down money supply growth. 
The strong showing of nationalist and conservative forces in 
the elections of December 1993, and the subsequent resigna-
tion from the government of several key reformers, has not 
led to backtracking from this relatively rigorous monetary and 
fiscal policy stance. As a result, inflation fell to well below 
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10% per month between March and June, and the Central 
Bank finance rate could be lowered gradually (to 155% by the 
end of June, or 330% when properly compounded) while re-
maining high in real tenns. Yet in other respects economic 
policy in recent months has not been particularly forceful, and 
many key decisions incurred long delays. Parliament adopted 
the 1994 budget only in late June; this budget provides for a 
deficit of just under 10% of GDP. Limiting the deficit to even 
such a relatively high number looks impossibly ambitious. 
Tax collection is nmning far below target, and there is much 
pressure from many interest groups, including the armed 
forces, for higher spending. 
This relatively rigorous macroeconomic stance has had its 
costs. The decline in output accelerated markedly during the 
first quarter of 1994, although it appears to have slowed again 
during the second qumter. Enterprises are adjusting to the 
squeeze through real wage decreases (e.g. by delayed pay-
ment, which rapidly lowers the value of wages because of 
inflation), by further cuts in investment, and by an·ears both 
to the tax authorities and to suppliers. Official unemployment 
figures are still low, and even data compiled according to stan-
dard ILO methodology put it at a moderate 6% or so. Yet there 
is mnple evidence of large-scale hidden unemployment. One 
reason is that firms may deduct up to six times the minimum 
wage per employee as costs for tax purposes, so retaining 
low-paid workers allows them to pay others more. 
In late May, President Yeltsin, who thus far had mostly left 
economic policy-making to the government, adopted a more 
active stance in this area by issuing a set of decrees intended 
to accelerate reform. They aim to streamline the tax system 
and to encourage foreign investment; some implementing 
legislation is still required, however. Another key measure 
was the reduction of export limitations on oil; if this had been 
implemented as planned on I July, it would have had the 
double benefit of increasing export earnings and of raising do-
mestic oil prices, which in turn would increase tax receipts, 
allow the ailing energy sector to invest more, and foster en-
ergy saving. In fact, resistance from vested interests which ob-
tain large rents from the existing distortions proved too great, 
and the measure was delayed for six months at least. 
External trade and payments have contracted sharply, with 
serious knock-on effects on domestic production. Trade with 
other parts of the former Soviet Union declined by over 30% 
in volume terms during 1992. Trade with countries outside 
the former Soviet Union declined also, but continued to yield 
a surplus of some $5 billion. Trade statistics for 1993 show 
exports flat in dollm· terms, but imports down by 27% com-
pm·ed to 1992; this led to a sharply increased trade surplus of 
$16 billion. First-qumter data for 1994 show a similar trend. 
In fact, this surplus may well be much smaller, since imports 
are probably under-reported. Also, much of the surplus is 
probably leaking away. There are signs of massive capital 
flight, which often seems to take the form of state enterprise 
managers keeping export proceeds outside the country. 
Structural reform has progressed only slowly in most respects 
- except as regards privatization. This has been a key com-
ponent of the government's strategy, and it is the one area that 
has remained almost unaffected by the deep divisions paralys-
ing economic policy-making. A substantial shm·e of small en-
terprises have been privatized, essentially in retail trade and 
services. For large enterprises, a mass privatization pro-
gramme was developed, under which free vouchers were dis-
tributed to the public in the last months of 1992. These 
vouchers could be used until end-June 1994 to bid for shares 
in privatization auctions. Under this process, well over half of 
all finns have been privatized. From July, a second phase was 
to start under which many remaining state assets will be sold 
off; however, the parliament has so far refused to endorse this 
second stage. Moreover, changes in ownership do not necess-
arily imply that restructuring is taking place, or that enter-
prises are starting to behave in a commercial fashion. 
Progress with putting the legislative and institutional frame-
work for a market economy in place has been patchy, and 
much remains to be done. A bankruptcy law came into force 
in March 1993, but has not begun to be implemented; this will 
in any case be difficult in view of the ill-equipped legal sys-
tem. The privatization of land, long a highly emotive and 
divisive issue, has been legally possible since 1993 but has 
barely begun to be implemented. In other areas, major re-
forms have yet to begin. One crucial issue is the social safety 
net: it will need to be reorganized, streamlined and better tar-
geted if it is to withstand the pressures of increasing unem-
ployment that will accompany enterprise restructuring. So far, 
there has been no constituency for social sector reform, 
though: radical reformers have tended to focus on fiscal disci-
pline and cost-cutting, and more conservative forces wish to 
avoid unemployment by keeping firms operating. Also, there 
is no industrial policy to speak of, and the weak and disorgan-
ized financial sector is a major brake on restructuring. 
Ukraine 
At the beginning of 1994, the economic situation in Ukraine 
continued to deteriorate at an alarming rate. Gross domestic 
product declined by an estimated 14% in 1993, and by more 
than 30 per cent during the first three months of 1994, before 
stabilizing thereafter. Official GDP estimates may well over-
state the real decline, but this is a very mixed blessing: infla-
tion, conuption and an erratic and often punitive tax system 
are driving more and more activity into an informal, unregis-
tered and inefficient barter society. 
TABLE 4 : UKRAINE - Main Economic Indicators 
Area ('OOO km2) 603.7 
Population (millions) 
Population density (per sq km) 
GDP at constant prices (a) 
Agricultural production (a) 
Industrial production ( a) 
Consumer price index (a) 
Unemployment rate, in% (b) 
Budget balance. o/r GDP (c) 
Trade balance.$ bn (d) 
Current account, $ bn ( d) 
Gross foreign debt.$ bn (b) 
1992 
-17 
-9 
-15 
1200 
() 
-29 
0.5 
0.5 
10 
52.2 
86 
1993 
-14 
-1 
-16 
4700 
0.3 
-13 
1.6 
1.9 
1994 
-34 
-5 
-38 
2200 
0.3 
-15 
(a) Percentage change (over the same period of) the previous year. 
(bJ End of period. 
(cJ Consolidated state budget deficit. accrual basis. 
(d) In convertible currencies. 
latest 
QI 
QI 
Jan-May 
June 
QI 
QI 
The Ukrainian economy thus continues the downward spiral 
that began in 1991, and in ear·ly 1994 registered economic ac-
tivity reached only about 40 per cent of its 1990-level. The 
key reason for this has been the continued absence of suffi-
cient political supprnt for any strategy to deal with the crisis 
which was caused by the disintegration of economic struc-
tures and links within the fonner Soviet Union, and by econ-
omic mismanagement. Another major factor has been Uk-
raine's acute shortage of energy and raw mate1ials, which 
were traditionally imported from Russia and other former So-
viet republics at prices significantly below world market 
prices, and for which Ukraine cannot pay under the new re-
gime because of a lack of hard-currency reserves and hard-
currency exports. Also, uncontrolled and unbacked credit and 
money emissions have been largely responsible for run-away 
inflation, and a payments crisis intensified the severity of the 
economic downturn. 
In late 1993, the authorities' primary economic concern be-
came the elimination of hyperinflation. Since December 1993 
the National Bank of Ukraine has been attempting to exercise 
greater monetary restraint, refinancing of commercial banks 
ha,; been limited, and interest rates have risen. Nevertheless, 
they remained sharply negative in real terms before monthly 
inf1ation came down to single-digit figures in March. The 
five-month credit squeeze has played a significant role in end-
ing the burst of hyperinflation that began last September. 
Whether it will bring lasting improvement remains to be seen. 
Until October 1992, when the government had to step down 
after the parliament passed a vote of no confidence, the thrust 
of economic policy design had been determined mainly by 
nationalist forces intent on asserting independence from Mos-
cow, who had neglected to introduce the legal and institu-
tional framework necessary for a well-functioning market 
economy. Indeed, the dominant role of state intervention and 
central planning had never really been challenged, and the 
necessary adjustment of the economy was not really allowed 
to proceed. Ministries were not prepared to reduce their grip 
on economic activity, employees did not accept a decline in 
real wages or an increase in productivity, which - in times 
of declining economic activity - would have required major 
labour-shedding, transfer recipients successfully fought for 
their allowances to be indexed, and enterprises passed on 
price increases for inputs to users instead of seeking to in-
crease efficiency and reduce input requirements. In attempt-
ing to maintain economic activity throughout the country, 
government, president and parliament had opted for a soft-
budget and central-planning approach, handing out subsidies 
to enterprises, allowing them to borrow on a large scale and 
channelling supply and demand by means of state orders. 
As a result, the government of Prime Minister Kuchma, 
which came to power in October 1992, was confronted with 
the daunting task of stabilizing the economy and stemming 
the fall in output. Because of the severity of the crisis, the gov-
ernment was granted powers to rule by decree on economic 
issues for a period of six months. An ambitious economic re-
form programme was adopted by the government in early 
January 1993. 
However, a political stalemate between the president, the gov-
ernment and the parliament prevented the pursuit of credible 
stabilization policies. The package of measures agreed with 
the lMF was effectively sabotaged in March 1993 when par-
liament, controlled by conservative enterprise and farm man-
agers, authorized a credit emission double that envisaged by 
the government (the National Bank of Ukraine is answerable 
only to parliament). 
The political crisis, essentially rooted in the struggle over 
economic reforms, came to a head in late May and early June 
1993, when the prime minister asked for a prolongation of his 
special powers and presented a new plan to stabilize the econ-
omy. It consisted of a two-year programme to speed up the 
privatization of industry and agriculture, a tough credit policy, 
controls over wages, further liberalization of foreign trade, the 
creation of free economic zones and further incentives to 
foreign investment. 
The conservative parliament, however, refused to provide the 
prime minister with the powers he asked for, and the political 
stalemate continued to drag on and to paralyse economic 
policy design. In the mean time, the economy drifted further 
towards chaos, the Ukrainian currency tumbled even against 
the Russian rouble and inflation continued unabated. By end-
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September 1993 the country was without a government, as 
the prime minister and his government resigned, social unrest 
was spreading across the country, and economic policy was 
going in the direction of reintroducing central planning mech-
anisms. Indeed, price controls as well as state orders for goods 
were reintroduced after the president took over as head of 
government. 
Since then, the economic crisis has deepened, and inflation 
accelerated to above 60 per cent per month by the end of the 
year. During the first six months of 1994, inflation was 
brought down substantially as the central bank tightened 
credit. Inflation for the month of June was about 4 per cent. 
This was expected to have led mainly to a sharp increase in 
arrears rather than to much real adjustment. However, sources 
from the National Bank of Ukraine claim that the arrears of 
credits issued have not been substantial so far, which suggests 
that the drop in inflation may be more durable than was first 
expected. 
The value of the Ukrainian interim currency has tumbled even 
against the Russian rouble: it stood at over 23 karbovanets per 
rouble in May 1994, having started out at par less than three 
years earlier. Public finances are weighed down by extremely 
high social transfers and a dwindling tax base. The deficit was 
some 30% of GDP in 1992, and probably well in excess of 
10% in 1993. Furthermore, Ukraine's balance-of-payments 
problems have worsened, and the trade deficit (essentially 
with Russia) is being financed by arrears. The shortage of im-
ported energy threatens to reduce economic activity further. 
Officially, unemployment is not a problem in Ukraine. In-
deed, the unemployment rate published by the Ministry of 
Statistics is still well below 0.5 per cent of the labour force. 
However, in his address to parliament, the outgoing acting 
prime minister (Zviagilskiy) estimated that some 2.2 million 
Ukrainians (about 10 per cent of the labour force) were on un-
paid leave in early 1994 because their enterprises had ceased 
production. 
Economic policy seems to be relying on muddling through 
rather than following any strategy, and an end to economic de-
cline and unsustainably high current-account deficits is not 
likely in the short run. The parliamentary elections in March 
I 994 led to a defeat of reformist forces, with the former 
communists emerging as the strongest force. The political 
stalemate continues, and it is unclear whether after the presi-
dential elections there will be an opportunity to initiate com-
prehensive and consistent economic reform. Indeed, the elec-
tion campaigns neglected economic issues and focused on the 
problem of Ukrainian independence from Russia. However, 
implementing a coherent economic reform programme and 
improving relations with Russia, the dominant supplier of key 
inputs for the Ukrainian economy will have to be core el-
ements of a policy aimed at stabilizing economic activity. The 
newly elected President Kuchma gained a reputation for sup-
porting economic reform when he led the government be-
tween late 1992 and mid-1993. 
Other states 
The situation in the other newly independent states varies 
considerably. All republics are more or less suffering from the 
collapse of inter-republic links and the weakening of old 
structures which have not yet been replaced by market-
oriented institutions. With the exception of Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and Belarus, where GDP declined by about 5 to 
10% in 1992, GDP dropped by about 15 to more than 50 per 
cent in all the other republics in 1992 (Kazakhstan and Kyr-
gyzstan: 15 to 20%; Moldova, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and 
Georgia: 30 to 40 per cent; and Armenia: more than 50 per 
cent). This decline in output went hand in hand with runaway 
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inflation and soaring budget deficits. In 1993 the deterioration 
of all key economic indicators continued in most republics, 
though at a slower pace. Only in Uzbekistan and Turkmenis-
tan is output estimated to have stabilized or even recovered, 
thanks to increased gas production. On the other hand, econ-
omic decline was steeper in 1993 than in 1992 in Belarus and 
probably also in Kyrgyzstan. Some newly independent 
states are making headway with economic reform. Further-
more, a number of NIS (Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan) 
have concluded arrangements with the IMF under the Sys-
temic Transformation Facility, and are negotiating stand-by 
arrangements with the Fund. Such an arrangement concluded 
with the Fund by Kyrgyzstan in May 1993 is on track, and 
Turkmenistan, which is rich in natural resources, has adopted 
an !MF-supported reform programme. Other states, however, 
have as yet done little to change the inherited economic struc-
tures. Some are hardly in a situation which allows them to 
contemplate systemic reform: Armenia is suffering a block-
ade, Tajikistan and Georgia are devastated by civil war or 
ethnic unrest. 
Inter-state issues 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) founded by 
eleven of the fifteen ex-Soviet republics (all but the Baltic 
states and Georgia) was initially heralded as the Soviet 
Union's successor. In mid-1992 Azerbaijan left the CJS, but 
rejoined in September 1993. Georgia joined in early I 994. So 
far, the CIS has mostly been a declaration of intent to maintain 
economic, political, and military cooperation among these ex-
Soviet republics. No institutional framework has been 
created. Disagreements and mutual suspicion between Russia 
and Ukraine have been a major factor behind this lack of re-
sults. 
Nevertheless, the negative consequences of economic disin-
tegration have led all the CIS states to reconsider closer econ-
omic cooperation with each other. Furthermore, five Central 
Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkme-
nistan and Uzbekistan) are contemplating forging closer 
economic ties among themselves. 
In early 1993 CIS heads of state reached agreement on 
cooperation in several areas, but not in the central fields of 
trade and money. In May nine CIS countries (all but Ukraine) 
signed a declaration of intent on setting up a closer economic 
alliance, and in mid-July Belarus, Ukraine and Russia agreed 
to cooperate more closely in some areas of economic policy. 
At the end of September, nine CIS states ( all but Ukraine and 
Turkmenistan) signed a treaty setting up a unified economic 
space, a unified customs regime and duty-free commodity 
traffic. Ukraine and Turkmenistan will be associate members. 
To be effective, however, this treaty will have to be adopted 
by the parliaments of the republics involved and will have to 
be followed by several agreements specifying the policies and 
procedures provided for in the signed framework agreement. 
Trade among the CIS states has declined sharply during the 
past years. This has had serious knock-on effects on output, 
since the Soviet economy was both highly integrated and 
monopolistic: disruption of traditional trade flows thus often 
means that firms are cut off from essential inputs, as the basic 
philosophy of central planning had been vertical and regional 
interdependence rather than horizontal and regional competi-
tion. The decline in trade is linked to Russia's position as the 
dominant economy and the major source of energy and raw 
materials. Russia has decided to reduce its trade surplus with 
the other republics through a series of inter-state bilateral 
agreements; these limit the trade deficits other states can have 
with it, and rely on state orders. Nevertheless, trade deficits 
of the other republics grew rapidly and are expected to widen 
in the future, once Russia charges world-market prices for its 
exports of oil and gas. This could make other republics' cur-
rent-account position unsustainable unless large-scale exter -
nal borrowing bridges the financing gap. 
In July 1993 Russia decided to invalidate as legal tender in 
Russia all rouble banknotes issued before 1993. This unilat-
eral decision took the Russian population as well as the 
member states of the CIS by surprise. Those republics which 
still used the rouble either as their own legal tender or as a par-
allel currency feared that the Russian decision would adverse-
ly affect their monetary stability and cross-border trading. 
After some weeks of negotiation, six countries of the CIS 
(Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Taji-
kistan) signed a framework agreement to keep the Russian 
rouble as their common currency. This agreement provides 
for a string of bilateral and multilateral treaties setting up a 
rouble zone in which five member states will have to adjust 
their customs, tax, banking and credit policies to standards set 
by Moscow before they are allowed to use the Russian rouble. 
In the mean time, however, all republics except Tajikistan 
have introduced their own currency in order to acquire an 
additional instrument of monetary policy. Whether these new 
currencies will serve only as interim currencies for Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Armenia pending the establish-
ment of the envisaged rouble zone is not yet clear. Most ad-
vanced are negotiations between Russia and Belarus, which 
signed an agreement on the unification of their monetary sys-
tems in April I 994. 
Czech Republic 
In the second half of 1994, the Czech Republic is well ad-
vanced in the process of economic transformation and in-
tegration into the world economy. Public finances are show-
ing a surplus, and so is the current account. Inflation seems 
to be under control, with a monthly rate of less than one per 
cent, and unemployment is negligible. Indeed, the Czech la-
bour market seems to suffer from a shortage of labour. After 
four years of economic decline, production has stabilized and 
will probably show modest growth in 1994. The private sec-
tor, which scarcely existed under central plmming, accounted 
for about 60 per cent of total production in early 1994. The 
country seems to have digested the separation from Slovakia 
quite well, and the Czech Republic remains attractive for 
foreign investment. Political stability and a broad social con-
sensus on the reform path are other facets of this favourable 
picture. 
In 1993, the Czech Republic's economic performance was 
negatively influenced by the economic consequences of the 
separation of the Czech and Slovak Republics, which led to 
a significant disintegration of the highly integrated Czechos-
lovak economy. Indeed, while economic activity began to re-
cover in the second half of 1992 after almost three years of 
sharp decline in domestic and external demand, a major econ-
omic setback took place in early 1993, the first months after 
the separation. 
A major reason for this setback was the sharp deterioration in 
export and import performance vis-a-vis Slovakia. While ex-
ternal trade with Western Europe showed dynamic growth 
rates, despite the recession in the most important western 
markets, trade with Slovakia initially shrank by more than a 
third, before recovering somewhat. Total exports showed 
only slight growth in I 993, and imports shrank. In conse-
quence, net exports were the most important source of econ-
omic recovery in the course of 1993, while the running down 
of inventories, which continued for the second consecutive 
year, was the most important negative influence on economic 
act1V1ty. Public finances remained balanced, and inflation, 
which picked up in January 1993 as a result of the introduc-
tion of VAT, came down to less than 1 per cent per month later 
in the year. 
In 1994, following a three-year decline and stagnation in 
1993, the Czech economy began to show an upward trend. 
According to the Czech Statistical Office's preliminary data, 
GDP in Ql 1994 grew by 3.5 per cent against the depressed 
level of the same period of 1993. Construction and selected 
services were the main contributors to growth on the supply 
side, while industrial production stagnated. On the demand 
side, vigorous growth continues in retail sales, up by 6.5 per 
cent in comparable prices. On the other hand, export growth 
slowed down and imports grew at an accelerating pace. 
The underlying trend in public finances remains healthy, with 
the budget posting a surplus equivalent to about 2 per cent of 
GDP for the first half 1994. Annual inflation, which in Febru-
ary came down to less than I O per cent for the first time since 
mid-1992, remained at this level for five consecutive months. 
However, money supply (M2) grew at an annualized rate of 
more than 15 per cent in the period until May, which called 
in question the central bank's inflation target of less than 10 
per cent. In consequence, the Czech National Bank tightened 
monetary policy by offering additional T-bills and by increas-
ing the minimum reserve requirement from 9 to 12 per cent 
in August. 
TABLE 5 : CZECH REPUBLIC - Main Economic Indicators 
Arca ('OOO km2) 78.9 
Population (millions) 10.4 
Population density (per sq km) 132 
1992 1993 1994 latest 
GDP at constant prices (a) -7 0 3.5 QI 
Agricultural production (a) -12 -1 
Industrial production (a) -11 -5 4.6 May 
Consumer price index (a) 11 21 9.7 June 
Unemployment rate, in % (b) 3 3 3.0 June 
Budget balance, % GDP (c) -1 0 2 HI 
Trade balance, $ bn (d) -0.7(g) 0.2 0.1 Jan-May 
Current account, $ bn (d) 0.2(f) 0.6 0.3 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (b) 9.5(f) 8.7 8.6 
Debt-export ratio, % (c) 84(f) 68 
(a) Percentage change over (the same period of) the previous year. 
(b) Enc.I ofperioc.1. 
( c) Consolic.latec.l state budget deficit. accrual basis. 
(<l) In convertible currencies. 
( e) Gross hare.I-currency debt as a percentage of hare.I-currency exports. 
(f) Refers to CSFR. 
(g) Excluc.les trade with Slovak Republic. 
Ql 
QI 
The tight labour market remains an extraordinary feature of 
the Czech transformation process which is not present in other 
Central and East European countries. Indeed, wage inflation 
started to accelerate in the course of 1993, mainly because of 
this tightness, the previous sharp fall in real wages, and lax 
wage discipline in enterprises that were still state-owned. This 
induced the government to re-establish wage controls, in the 
form of an excessive-wage tax. However, once recently priva-
tized large enterprises begin to restructure and to improve la-
bour productivity (through labour-shedding), the labour 
market should become less tight, which should help to con-
tain wage inflation. 
Although the net inflow of foreign direct investment slowed 
down in 1993 to US$ 517 m (from US$ 980 m in 1992), the 
Czech Republic has been experiencing a surge in other capital 
inflows since the third quarter of 1993. Net portfolio invest-
ment (to a large extent in the form of equity purchases) in 
1993 reached US$ 1062 m, and Czech enterprises borrowed 
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abroad US$ 750 m (mainly in the form of bank credits). Fur-
thennore, the Czech National Bank last year successfully 
placed several international bond issues. This increased pres-
ence of the Czech Republic on international capital markets 
has been reinforced since the international rating agencies up-
graded it to an "investment grade" in autumn I 993. 
The combination of a healthy current account position and a 
strong capital inflow has put upward pressure on the nominal 
exchange rate and has resulted in a rapid growth of official 
foreign exchange reserves, which stood at US$ 5.1 bn in early 
June 1994, compared to US$ 0.7 bn at end-1992. In order to 
relieve the upward pressure on the exchange rate, the Czech 
National Bank is planning to make the crown convertible for 
capital account transactions and to implement a phased lib-
eralization of controls on capital outflows. In early March it 
announced that it will gradually waive the obligation of Czech 
exporters to surrender to the central bank their hard-currency 
proceeds. 
The Czech economy can be described as a fully fledged 
market economy insofar as all the institutions for a working 
market economy are in place. Indeed, prices and trade were 
liberalized at the outset of the transformation process, and cur-
rent-account conve1tibility of the domestic currency was es-
tablished. Since then large parts of state-owned property have 
been privatized, the tax system and the system of social secur-
ity contributions and benefits have been brought into line with 
western standards, and the legislation necessary for efficient 
decentralized economic decision-making has been put in 
place. 
The privatization process is continuing with the second wave 
of voucher privatization, in which 770 companies worth Czk 
145 bn are expected to be privatized. About six million people 
were registered as having bought voucher books, which is 
even more than in the first wave. The transfer of ownership 
of the assets sold under the second wave of large-scale pri-
vatization should be completed by end-1994, by which time 
about 90% of the productive capacity of the economy will be 
in private hands. 
The transformation process is still far from complete, and 
difficult microeconomic issues have still to be tackled. Now 
that the institutional framework has been established, it will 
be necessary to set the microeconomic incentives in a way 
that will maintain or establish competition on factor and 
goods markets, to foster efficiency in both the private and the 
public sector, and to provide a social safety net and other 
public goods which do not financially overburden future gen-
erations. Furthermore, some bad legacies of the old system, 
such as the indebtedness of old enterprises, the poor state of 
the capital stock, or environmental burdens will continue to 
absorb scarce resources and will make the transformation path 
ahead difficult. 
Estonia 
The decline in GDP which began in 1990 appeared to bottom 
out in 1993. The fall in 1993 was only 7.8% compared to 23% 
in 1992. Moreover, there are signs that industrial output began 
to recover from mid-1993 onwards. The root cause of the de-
cline was the deterioration in trading conditions, which was 
aggravated by the stabilization policies pursued. The Estonian 
authorities expect growth to resume in 1994. 
Registered unemployment has yet to reach significant levels 
in Estonia, despite the reduction in economic activity. In June 
1994 unemployment stood at 2.1 % of the labour force. Enter-
prises are reluctant to implement redundancies, as this renders 
them liable for up to eight months' severance pay. They avoid 
these provisions by allowing workers to go on indefinite 
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leave, or by retaining them at the minimum wage level, effec-
tively concealing unemployment and delaying restructuring. 
Estonia's trade deficit more than doubled from $62.7m in 
1992 to $141. 9m in 1993 as imports steadily picked up with 
the recovery of economic activity. The deficit has continued 
to grow in 1994, amounting to about $ l 50m in the first five 
months of the year. However, the strength of Estonian freight 
and shipping earnings during 1993 bolstered the services ba-
lance, which limited the increase in the current account defi-
cit. A significant reorientation of trade towards the west began 
in mid-1992 and continued in 1993. A free trade agreement 
with Latvia and Lithuania has been in force since I April 
1994. 
Estonia has consistently managed to achieve budget surpluses 
over the past three years, despite difficult circumstances: tax 
arrears in the enterprise sector remain significant ( estimated 
at about 3% of GDP), and pressure on expenditures, particu-
larly the financing of the social safety net, is intense. A sur-
plus of 0.2% of GDP was achieved in 1993. The government 
programme for 1994 envisages a deficit of no more than l % 
of GDP. 
TABLE 6: ESTONIA- Main Economic Indicators 
Arca('000krn2) 45.1 
Population (millions) 1.5 
Population density (per sq km) 33 
1992 1993 1994 
GDP at constant prices (a) -23.0 -7.8 
Agricultural production (a) -21.3 
Industrial production (a) -38.7 -28.4 
Consumer price index (a) 1075.9 89.8 •+7.5 
Unemployment rate, in % (b) 1.5 1.7 2.1 
Budget balance. c1r. GDP (c) 0.8 0.2 
Trade balance. $ bn (d) -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
Current account. $ hn (d) 0.0 00 
Gross foreign debt, $ nm (c) 66 85.0 
(a) Percentage change over (the same period of) the previous year. 
( b) End of period. 
(c) Consolidated state budget deficit. accrual basis. 
(d) In convertible currcnci~s. 
(e) End of period. Not including liabilities of the USSR. 
latest 
Jan-Nov 
Jan-June 
June 
Jan-May 
June 
Price liberalization has progressed well in Estonia, and most 
subsidies have been removed. Inflation has been brought 
under control since the currency reform in mid-1992. al-
though not as quickly as had been expected. Recent months 
have seen a resurgence of inflationary pressures in the econ-
omy: since November monthly inflation has averaged 4.1 %, 
peaking at 8.9% in March. The strong increase in the prices 
of imports from Russia is cited as one of the main reasons for 
the upturn in inflation, but the rise in foreign currency reserves 
and the ccmesponding increase in domestic money supply is 
perhaps a more important factor. Monthly inflation has fallen 
consistently since March and reached a two-year low in June 
at 0.7%. 
Beginning in mid-1992, a tax-based incomes policy was suc-
cessful in keeping real wages broadly constant, thereby pro-
tecting Estonia's competitiveness. The tax-based incomes 
policy has since been replaced by pre-announced semi-annual 
inflation targets, which form the basis of pay claims, along 
with firm-specific productivity agreements. 
A two-tier banking system has been established. The central 
bank (Bank of Estonia) was founded in 1990 and took on full 
central banking responsibilities at the beginning of 1992, 
when it absorbed the Estonian branch of Gosbank. The p1i-
vate commercial banking sector comprised 43 banks in Sep-
tember 1992. A number of these banks were established by 
groups of state enterprises specifically to serve their financing 
needs and were effectively 'tied' to the enterprises. A liquidity 
crisis began towards the end of 1992, since when the central 
bank has revoked a number of banks' licences and has raised 
the minimum capital requirements. The subsequent merger 
activity resulted in the reduction in the number of commercial 
banks to 22. B,mks' asset portfolios remain burdened with 
bad loans. In addition, the great majority of deposits are short 
tenn, which also limits banks' new lending activities to short-
tenn projects, such as trade financing. This, combined with 
the banks' general caution engendered by the uncertain econ-
omic environment, has severely limited the supply of long-
tem1 credit to the enterprise sector, which hinders restructur-
ing. Most banks are currently trying hard to augment their 
capital by equity issues and foreign partnerships. 
Estonia left the rouble zone by introducing its own currency, 
the kroon, in June 1992. The kroon is pegged to the OM and 
is convertible for current account purposes, with controlled 
capital account convertibility. So far the kroon has maintained 
its peg to the OM despite a significant real appreciation result-
ing from Estonia's higher domestic inflation. A currency 
board system has been established which strictly limits the 
issue of money to the amount of reserves held. The crnrency 
was initially backed by about $ I 20m-worth of reserves, with 
a further $40m of free reserves also held by the central bank. 
Reserves have subsequently increased strongly and now total 
over $300m. It remains to be seen whether the currency board 
will be retained as domestic demand recovers and a more flex-
ible monetary regime is needed. 
Privatization in Estonia began with the sale of small enter-
prises, of which over 80% have now been sold into private 
ownership. Privatization of larger enterprises has progressed 
more slowly. The major impediment has been the long-
drawn-out restitution process. With the deadline for restitu-
tion claims now passed, successful claimants will receive 
either restitution of physical property or compensation 
through privatization vouchers or bonds. Under the medium-
and large-scale privatization programme 52 enterprises had 
been privatized by the end of 1993 out of a total of 155 offered 
for sale. A further 56 enterprises were recently advertised in 
the fifth round of auctions. [n an eff011 to encourage invest-
ment, the authorities have changed the criteria for the selec-
tion of successful bids in the most recent round, moving away 
from a 'best price basis' and emphasizing the quality of the 
business plan. Preparations are under way for privatizations 
by public share subscription, and the government is in the 
process of elaborating a plan for privatization through 
vouchers. A separate department has been established in the 
Ministry of Economy with responsibility for restructuring 
state finns before privatization. This department set up 'in-
dustry boards' which are designed to fulfil the role of share-
holders. They have the power to dismiss and replace the man-
agement of a state-owned enterprise if perfonnance is 
considered to be inadequate. 
Hungary 
In spite of the collapse in exports, the recession stai1ed to bot-
tom out in 1993 with, for the first time in four years, increases 
in domestic demand. In 1994. economic indicators are point-
ing to an overall strengthening of the recovery: wages are in-
creasing strongly, exports are starting to grow again, corporate 
tax is yielding higher returns than expected, investment and 
order indicators are improving, unemployment is decreasing 
further. However, severe macroeconomic imbalances make 
this growth unsustainable: in 1994, public deficits are likely 
to remain in the order of 6 to 7% of GDP for the third consecu-
tive year, and the current account deficit will be. as in 1993, 
close to 7% of GDP; in addition, government debt, which in-
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creased from 50.8% of GDP in 1990 to 73.7% of GDP in 
1993, will pl~ce ~ heavy st~~in c_m the economy. The newly 
elected sociahst-hberal coalition mtends to restore macroeco-
nomic balances and has declared that 1995 will be the year of 
self-restraint. 
According to recently published national accounts, GDP de-
clined by, respectively, 4.3% and 2.3% in 1992 and in 1993. 
It is forecast at best to grow by less than 2% in 1994. The 
gloomier than expected economic outcome in 1993 was en-
tirely relat~d to the bad external performance of the Hungarian 
economy: m volume, expmts fell by 12% and imports grew 
by 19%. On the domestic side, encouraging developments oc-
~urred in consumption and investment. Private consumption 
mc1:eased ~y .1.4~c, as a result of a reduction of savings: the 
savmgs ratio tell from 19 .6% in 1992 to 11.2 % in 1993, while 
real disposable income declined further. Fixed investment 
stagnated. The main driving forces of the recovery process in 
19~3 ~ere the rebuilding of stocks and public consumption, 
which mcreased by 30.5% in real terms. 
Recent output tre~ds indicate that a modest recovery is 
under way. Industnal output rose by 4% in 1993 over 1992. 
Apart from food industries and the mining and energy sec-
tors, all sectors recorded positive growth rates, with the best 
petf~rrna.nce in machinery and building material industries. In 
the trrst four months of 1994, industrial output grew, year on 
year,_ by 7 .8%, but with a big jump in January and a continu-
ous fall thei:eafter. The tall ~s concentrated, mainly, in two sec-
tors: ~achmery and furniture. Industrial output growth in 
1993 did not compensate for the 6% fall in agricultural output. 
In 1994, both sectors are expected to record positive growth. 
TABLE 7 : HUNGARY - Main Economic Indicators 
Area ("000 km2) 93.6 
Population (miJJions) l(U 
Population density (per sq km) 110 
1992 1993 1994 
GDP at constant prices (a) -4.3 -2.3 
Agricultural production (a) -23.0 -6.0 
Industrial production (a) -9.8 4.0 7.8 
Consumer price index (a) 23.0 22.5 17.6 
Unemployment rate, in % (b) 12.2 12.1 11.0 
Budget balance. 'k GDP (c) -7.8 
Trade balance, $ bn (d) 0.0 -3.2 -I. I 
Current account, $ bn (d) 0.3 -3.5 -1.4 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (b) 21.4 24.5 25.6 
Debt-export ratio. '7r (e) 214 302 
(a) Percentage change over (the same period or) the previous year. 
(b) End of period. 
(c) Consolidated state budget deficit, accrual basis. 
( d I ln convertible currencies. 
latest 
Jan-Apr 
Jan-June 
June 
Jan-May 
Jan-May 
Apr 
( e I Gross hard-currency debt as a percentage of hard-currency exports. 
After a peak of 705,000 in February 1993, the number of reg-
istered unemployed steadily declined to 549,880 in June 
1994, corresponding to 11.0% of the work-force. This trend 
partl;'._ ret1ects .. the_ decreasing number of people receiving 
benef1~, and eftechv~ unemployment is thought to be nearly 
30% higher than registered unemployment. However, most of 
the labour-shedding related to restructuring is believed to be 
over. After four years of decline, real wages started to grow 
again in 1994, with a year-on-year increase of 7. I% in real net 
average earnings in the first five months of 1994. The new 
government views such large gains as unjustified and intends 
to impose wage moderation through a social pact in the au-
tumn. This will be a test for the credibility and support of the 
new coalition, which intends as well to increase the tax 
burden on households and to reduce social benefits. 
Inflation remained high in 1993 with an inflation rate of 
22.5%, close to the 1992 level of 23%. Jn 1994, inflation ex-
pectations are still high, ranging between 17% and 22%, but 
the results for the first six months point to the lower limit of 
the range: the consumer price index rose by 17 .6% compared 
to the same period last year. 
Fiscal restraint and public finance refonns are at the top of the 
new government's agenda. Thanks to substantial tax revenues 
at the end of the year. the 1993 deficit target was met with an 
estimated deficit of 6.2% of GDP. The 1994 budget wa'i ap-
proved by the Parliament in December 1993 with a consoli-
dated budget deficit of Ft 330 bn. Mid-year results show that 
the mid-year target was overshot by Ft 20 bn. The new crov-
emrnent will suhmit a supplementary bill to the Parliame~t in 
October to seek approval for a public expenditure cut of 
Ft 50 bn. This will entail mainly freezing the unspent budget-
ary reserve, but might also imply bringing forward the switch 
to a single-tier VAT or cancelling the Expo world fair. In the 
longer term. the government intends to unde1take a system-
atic review and redefinition of all budget lines. The 29 extra-
budge~aiy funds, _which_ amount to 17% of budget expendi-
tur~s m 1994, will be mtegrated into the budget. Only the 
regional, agncultural and employment funds will remain. To 
streamline public expenditure, a public procurement law will 
be prepared. Pension and health benefits will be scaled down 
by shortening maternity leave, raising the retirement age for 
women, reducing family allowances and ticrhtenincr entitle-
. b b 
ment to sick leave. The tax burden will be shifted away from 
the corporate sector and investment to household income and 
consumption, and from central to local government. Tax 
collection and discipline will be strengthened. 
The collapse of exports in 1993 resulted in large deficits of 
US$ 3.2 billion for the trade account and US$ 3.5 billion for 
the current account. The trade and current accounts showed 
deficits of, respectively, US$ I. I bn and US$ 1.4 bn at the 
end of May 1994. Projections for 1994 foresee again a current 
account deficit of more than US$ 3 bn. In contrast with the 
across-the-board decline of exports and increase in imports in 
1993, the trade dynamics changed slightly in 1994: in the first 
five months of 1994, exports and imports grew simultaneous-
ly by, respectively, 4.7% and 4.2% over the same period last 
year. Exports of energy and food products, in relative terms, 
grew faster, while import growth mainly reflected greater de-
mand for food and consumer goods. After a temporary rever-
sal in 1993, the share of the European Union in Hungarian 
trade started to grow again in 1994, reaching 44.1 % of im-
ports and 50.1 % of exports. 
In view of Hungary's debt service obligations of about 
US$ 3 bn per year, the target level for official reserves in 
foreign currencies is US$ 6 bn. Official reserves expanded 
throughout 1993 and reached US$ 6.2 bn at the end of April 
1994 compared to US$ 4.4 bn at end-1992. Correspondingly, 
the gross external debt in convertible currencies increased to 
US$ 25.6 bn at the end of April 1994 from US$ 21.4 bn at the 
end of 1992. Foreign direct investment nearly doubled in 
1993 compared to each of the two previous years. rising to 
US$ 2.3 bn; almost half of this amount was the result of a 
single cash payment for Hungarian Telecom. In the first four 
months of 1994, US$ 302 million came into the country. 
slightly below average monthly inflows recorded in the last 
four years. But large transactions related to privatization are 
expected later in the year and should ensure that the int1ow of 
direct investment is close to last year's record. 
The forint was under severe attack on the domestic inter-bank 
foreign exchange market following the victory of the socialist 
party in May. The new government, however, has made very 
clear its intention to continue the past anti-inflationary ex-
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change rate policy through regular small devaluations to keep 
the real exchange rate constant. The forint was devalued by 
15% against the dollar-ECU basket in 1993, and was again 
devalued by 1.9% in January, by 2.6% in February, by 1 % in 
May, and by 1.2% in June I 994. This has not closed the con-
troversy about the exchange rate policy, and the advocates of 
a large one-off devaluation still claim that a devaluation 
would be less painful than fiscal restraint to restore external 
balance. Progress towards convertibility was made in January 
1994, with the NBH's decision to discontinue its foreign ex-
change transactions at fixed selling and buying rates and to 
intervene exclusively on the inter-bank foreign exchange 
market. It was decided to allow foreigners to hold convertible 
fotint accounts from I June so as to permit the Forint to be 
used in international transactions. In May 1994, the NBH re-
placed the 0-Mark by the ECU in the currency basket to 
which the Forint is pegged. The new basket is composed of 
the ECU (70%) and the US dollar (30% ). 
With the change in government, privatization is now coming 
to a turning point: after a slowdown in the privatization pro-
cess in 1993 and a near-freeze in the first half of 1994, the pri-
vatization strategy is being completely revised. Privatization 
will be accelerated with the aim of completing it by 1996. The 
socialist-liberal coalition intends to suspend the Small In-
vestor Share Programme; to merge the privatization agency, 
SPA, and the state asset management holding, Av Rt; and to 
wind up as quickly as possible the compensation programme 
of Ft 300 bn. The list of companies that are to remain pe1ma-
nently state-owned will be revised and bank ptivatization will 
be speeded up. The management of companies under pe1ma-
nent state ownership will be delegated to banks or investment 
companies. Privatization methods will be developed with a 
view to expanding portfolio investment. 
The restructuring strategy is also being changed. The new 
government's intentions regarding the ongoing financial sec-
tor reform are not known. The new government will likely 
discontinue or sharply cut back the bank consolidation 
scheme launched in November 1993 to recapitalize the banks 
by converting the banks' bad debts into 20-year treasury 
bonds and assisting banks to set up work-out units to deal 
with insolvent enterprises. Its intention is also to tighten eligi-
bility crite1ia for government support to indebted companies. 
In addition, in companies which were rescued with public re-
sources, financial discipline, in patticular wage discipline, 
will be strengthened. 
The new government is adopting a courageous stand on fiscal 
and company restructuring issues. The overall impact on the 
economy has not been quantified yet, but if the government 
gets the political and social support to implement its policy 
in the autumn, it is unlikely that the optimistic official forecast 
announced in the spring of modest GDP growth in 1994 will 
materialize. 
Latvia 
The continuous fall in GDP since 199 l came to an end in the 
fourth quatter of 1993 when economic activity began to pick 
up again. The overall decline in GDP in I 993 was 12%. The 
sharp contraction during the previous three years was a result 
of the substantial terms-of-trade loss, the general breakdown 
in traditional trading patterns and the reduction in domestic 
demand brought about by the stabilization measures. The 
government's stabilization efforts are currently being sup-
ported by the IMF through a stand-by loan and a systemic 
transformation facility loan. The government expects GDP to 
grow by 4% in 1994. 
In May unemployment in Latvia accounted for 6.6% of the 
work-force. Unemployment has increased sharply since the 
first quarter of 1993, as the government has become more 
willing to accept widespread bankruptcies. However, hidden 
unemployment is still prevalent; many industrial employees 
are on indefinite unpaid leave and wage payments are being 
delayed by a number of months. The government expects 
open unemployment to increase to about 12% in I 994. 
The balance of trade showed a $68m deficit in 1993, but 
strong shipping and freight earnings resulted in a slight cur-
rent account surplus. Imports have picked up in 1994 as econ-
omic activity has recovered, resulting in the emergence of a 
current account deficit. 
In 1993, despite lower than expected revenues and significant 
ente1prise tax arrears, the budget showed a surplus amounting 
to I% of GDP. In order to boost revenues and help balance the 
budget the government increased the basic rate of VAT from 
12% to 18% from November 1993. This increase was also ex-
tended to food products from the beginning of June 1994. The 
government envisages a budget deficit of up to 2% of GDP 
in 1994. 
Price liberalization has proceeded at a steady pace in Latvia 
since January 199 l and is now virtually complete. Real wages 
have declined significantly since the introduction of active in-
comes policies in mid-1992. Inflation had moderated con-
siderably by mid-1993 but increased again in the final quarter 
of the year. In the first six months of 1994 inflation continued 
at well above the tai·get of an average monthly rate of 0.5%. 
Increases in food prices contributed most to the overshooting. 
These are partly a result of the protection of domestic agricul-
tural producers by tariffs on imported food products. Food 
prices increased further in June following the increase in VAT 
on food items. Large capital inflows have led to increases in 
domestic money supply, which have also had a significant im-
pact on price developments. 
A parallel currency - the Latvian rouble - replaced the 
rouble in July 1992, and the national currency (the !at), fully 
replaced the Latvian rouble in October 1993. Under a floating 
exchange rate regime monetary policy was initially tight, and 
the Latvian rouble/lat accordingly appreciated against its 
counterparts in other former Soviet republics, and against the 
US dollar and the Deutsche Mark. The unprecedented in-
creases in capital inflows, however, have resulted in both an 
appreciation of the !at and an overshooting of the reserve 
money performance criterion under the IMF stand-by pro-
gramme. Consequently Latvia has been unable to purchase 
the next tranche under the stand-by agreement. The author-
ities intend to allow the !at to continue under a managed float 
with no formal peg but with reference to the SOR. 
The Bank of Latvia was established in 1990 and subsequently 
took over the functions of the Latvian branch of Gosbank, as 
well as the state commercial banks. In June 1992, however, 
the state commercial banks were effectively separated from 
the central bank. The bank is responsible for monetary and ex -
change rate policy. The 48 branches of the central bank have 
been audited, and 27 have been privatized individually. The 
remaining 21 were consolidated under one core bank, Uni-
bank. This bank is to be recapitalized using money raised 
from a 57.Sm-Iat state bond issue and foreign assistance. The 
private banking sector has expanded; about 60 banks had been 
created by the end of September I 993. So far, one foreign 
bank has set up business in Riga. The central bank has devel-
oped its prudential supervisory capacity. Two banks were 
closed during 1993. The central bank has raised the minimum 
capital requirement from 25,000 Iats to l 00,000 lats. The 
combination of confidence in the currency and liberal foreign 
exchange regulations has resulted in deposits being attracted 
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from throughout the former Soviet Union, particularly Rus-
sia. These deposits carry high rates, a<s the banks are currently 
able to finance highly profitable short-term re-export activity 
at even higher loan rates. This effectively crowds out longer-
term productive investment by enterprises. 
TABLE 8: LATVIA- Main Economic Indicators 
Area ('OOOkm2) 64.5 
Population (millions) 2.6 
Population density (per sq km) 40 
1992 1993 1994 
GDP at constant prices (a) -32.9 -12.0 
Agricultural production (a) -13.0 -2.8 
Industrial production (a) -35.1 -39.6 
Consumer price index (a) 909.6 109.2 
Unemployment rate, in % (b) 2.3 5.3 32.4 
Budget balance,% GDP (c) -1.4 1.0 6.6 
Trade balance, $ bn (d) -0.1 -0.l 
Current account, $ bn (d) 0.0 0.0 
Gross foreign debt, $ mn (e) 23.5 
(a) Percentage change over (the same period of) the previous year. 
(b) End of period. 
( c) Consolidated state budget deficit, accrual basis. 
(d) In convertible currencies. 
(e) End of period. Not including liabilities of the USSR. 
latest 
Jan-June 
Jan-Nov 
Jan-June 
May 
Privatization so far has progressed only slowly in Latvia, 
mainly because of the problems surrounding the restitution 
issue and the definition of property rights. Out of a total of 
nearly 250,000 claims only some 70,000 have been pro-
cessed. The only area of significant progress has been small-
scale privatization: 55% of eligible small-scale enterprises 
have been privatized. By December 1993 only 22 large-scale 
enterprises had been privatized. To accelerate the pace of pri-
vatization the government has submitted a number of laws for 
parliamentary approval. First, the deadline for restitution 
claims is to be brought forward. Second, the government has 
created a single privatization agency. The government is aim-
ing to complete about 200 privatizations this year through 
public auctions and tenders. In addition, a state property fund 
has been created to manage those enterprises remaining in the 
public sector. Vouchers have been issued for use in a com-
prehensive privatization programme covering all state-owned 
property, including land, apartments, shares in enterprises and 
special privatization investment funds. 
Lithuania 
GDP is estimated to have declined by 17.0% in 1993, follow-
ing declines of 37.7% in 1992 and 12.8% in 1991. This came 
about mainly because of the deterioration in the trade situation 
and the macroeconomic stabilization programme. The gov-
ernment expects modest growth (1.2%) to resume in 1994. 
The IMF, however, expects stronger growth, in the region of 
4% to 5%. 
According to the Department of Statistics, industrial produc-
tion was 46% lower in 1993 than in 1992. This figure, how-
ever, does not reflect the more modest decline in GDP in 
1993. The Ministry of Economy estimates industrial produc-
tion to have fallen by 25% in 1993, which is more consistent 
with the GDP figure. Moreover, this large overall decline 
masks the stabilization in activity that occurred from mid-
year. The large agricultural sector was severely affected by the 
drought in 1992, when the decline in output was estimated at 
24%, but the sector declined less severely in 1993. Registered 
unemployment stood at 3.2% of the work-force in June 1994. 
Hidden unemployment, however, is estimated to be as high 
as 140,000 or 7.4% of the work-force; many workers are 
working part-time or on indefinite unpaid leave. 
Price liberalization has progressed to the extent that all goods 
and services except household energy products and monopoly 
products are decontrolled. With the introduction of active sta-
bilization policies in July 1992, incomes policy was set so as 
to control inflation by using forward-looking guidelines 
based on the inflation targets of the stabilization programme. 
Real wages remained broadly stable during 1993. Monthly 
inflation averaged 14.2% in the first half of 1993, declining 
to an average of 4.7% in the second half of the year. This last 
figure conceals, however, the recent upturn in inflation, which 
averaged 6.8% per month in the final quarter of 1993. Infla-
tion persisted at relatively high rates, averaging 3.5% per 
month, in the first six months of 1994. This increase is a result 
of a combination of factors, including further reductions in 
subsidies; seasonal increases in food prices and the effect of 
higher tariffs on food imports; and the rise in the price of es-
sential imports from Russia. In addition, the rise in domestic 
money supply resulting from increased capital inflows has ad-
versely affected price developments. 
The trade balance moved into deficit in 1993 as imports 
picked up in line with economic activity. Trade continues to 
be heavily oriented towards former Soviet republics, mainly 
Russia. Although the government publishes indicative lists of 
items that are required by former Soviet republics which re-
tain the system of state orders, there is no obligation for Li-
thuanian enterprises to fulfil these lists and trading is on an 
enterprise-to-enterprise basis only. Trade with former Soviet 
partners recovered somewhat during 1993. However, in the 
absence of a convertible currency in most of these countries, 
enterprises tend to resort to barter deals. 
The 1993 budget showed a surplus of about 1 % of GDP. A 
deficit of between 1 % and 1.5% of GDP is programmed for 
1994. The deficit in the first half of 1994, however, exceeded 
expectations mainly because of a large shortfall in social se-
curity revenues. The government has begun to finance this 
deficit by the sale of treasury bills. 
TABLE 9: LITHUANIA-Main Economic Indicators 
Area('ooo 1<m2) 65.2 
Population (millions) 3.7 
Population density (per sq km) 57 
1992 1993 1994 
GDP at constant prices (a) -37.7 -17.0 
Agricultural production (a) -24.0 -8.0 
Industrial production (a,b) -51.6 -46.0 
Consumer price index (a) 1020.5 410.1 99.3 
Unemployment rate, in % (c) 1.0 1.6 3.2 
Budget balance, % GDP (d) 0.6 0.9 
Trade balance, $ bn (e) 0.1 -0.3 
Current account, $ bn (c) 0.1 -0.2 
Gross foreign debt, $ mn (f) 126 
(a) Percentage change over (the same period of) the previous year. 
(b) State-owned sector only. 
(c) End of period. 
(d) Consolidated state budget deficit, accrual basis. 
(e) In convertible currencies. 
(f) End of period. Not including liabilities of the USSR. 
latest 
Jan-June 
June 
The rouble was replaced first by a coupon (the talonas) in Oc-
tober 1992 and then by the full national currency (the litas) in 
July 1993. The litas was initially backed by reserves of about 
$200m and is convertible for current account purposes. 
Growing confidence in the currency has resulted in a substan-
tial inflow of hard currency. This has led to an appreciation 
of the litas and increases in reserve money beyond the limits 
set out in the IMF programme. The central bank is criticized 
by the industrial lobby for the strength of the litas and at the 
same time faces pressure from the IMF to limit the emission 
of domestic currency. A solution to this problem would be to 
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sterilize the capital inflows and corresponding litas emissions 
by sales of government paper on the open market. The prime 
minister, however, has put a stop to this, as it reduces the cen-
tral bank's profits from seignorage, which are used for budget 
purposes. This problem led the government to introduce a 
currency board, thereby replacing the reserve money perform-
ance criterion with the requirement of full foreign currency 
backing of the currency board liabilities. The currency board 
came into force on I April this year, with the litas pegged to 
the dollar. 
Privatization initially progressed rapidly in Lithuania, but has 
slowed in recent months. The basic mechanism employed has 
been to issue citizens with vouchers which can be used in part 
payment, with cash, for the various privatization offerings. So 
far these have included the privatization of residential prop-
erty (nearly 90% of privatizations requested by the occupants 
have been completed); the privatization of small firms by auc-
tion ( over 80% of total completed); and the privatization of 
medium-sized and hrrge enterprises (1,981 in total, represent-
ing 23% of all such enterprises). Certain selected enterprises 
have been sold to foreign investors through a tender process. 
By the first quarter of I 994 about 45% of all state productive 
assets had been privatized, most of which was accounted for 
by large enterptises. However, little attention has been de-
voted to restructuring: many firms are now effectively 
worker-controlled, which further hinders rationalization and 
labour-shedding. In order to limit this, the government has 
promulgated legislation that would remove all preferential 
treatment for employees and managers in the privatization 
process. Implementation of the bankruptcy law is difficult and 
is hampered by the lack of capacity of the courts. Neverthe-
less, bankruptcies have taken place and indications are that 
enterprise indebtedness has stopped growing, which suggests 
that financial discipline is being imposed. The government in-
tends to revise the bankruptcy law with a view to making im-
plementation easier. 
Agricultural privatization has progressed with the breaking up 
of collective farms into smaller units. The process is expected 
to continue as the thousands of restitution claims are pro-
cessed. This has already resulted in a reduction in farm size 
to an average of 8.6 ha, which the authorities consider to be 
too small to be efficient. To promote consolidation, the auth-
orities are considering offering compensation rather than land 
to a larger number of restitution claimants, and providing 
preferential credit for holdings above I 5 ha. The government 
has also banned further breaking up of units already below 20 
ha. 
Significant progress has been made in dismantling the mono-
bank and replacing it with a two-tier banking structure. 
Twenty-two commercial branches have been separated from 
the central bank as fully private concerns, and the remaining 
ten commercial branches have been separated by the creation 
of the State Commercial Bank. This last, along with the State 
Agricultural Bank and the State Savings Bank, will be audited 
in the coming months with a view to eventual privatization. 
The government has undertaken to cover the assets of the 
Savings Bank that are held in Moscow and are unlikely to be 
returned. A referendum is to be held on the question of in-
dexation of personal savings deposits. The banking sector 
generally is beset with problems of non-performing loans and 
is in need of restructuring. The introduction of a comprehen-
sive new set of banking laws has been delayed in parliament 
because of the urgency of the currency board legislation. The 
World Bank has temporarily suspended lending activity in Li-
thuania until the legal framework of the banking sector has 
been improved. In particular, the Bank is concerned about the 
growth of unlicensed para-banking institutions which do not 
fall under the central bank's supervision. In the case of li-
censed banks, however, the Bank of Lithuania has become 
more active in its supervision policy, compelling banks to 
comply with regulatory norms by temporarily suspending 
new loan/deposit activity. 
Poland 
The Polish economy has continued to grow strongly since the 
onset of recovery in I 992. In 1993 GDP is estimated to have 
increased by 3.8% while industrial output grew by 7.9%. In 
the first half of 1994 industrial output increased by 9. 9% com-
pared to the same period in I 993. However, output remains 
well below the level achieved in I 989, before the launching 
of the economic stabilization and reform programme. The 
government expects GDP to increase by 4.5% in 1994. 
The stabilization programme helped to reduce inflation from 
640% in 1989 to 35.3% in 1993. This last figure, however, 
exceeded the government's target of reducing inflation in 
1993 to 32%. The overshooting of the target was caused by 
unexpectedly large increases in monthly inflation of 4.0% in 
November and 5.6% in December. Although the rate of price 
increases in the first six months of 1994 has fallen from these 
high levels, inflation remains higher than had been expected, 
prompting the Central Planning Office to revise upwards its 
forecast for end of year inflation from 27% to 31 %. 
TABLE I O: POLAND - Main Economic Indicators 
Arca ('OOO km2) 318.3 
Population (millions) 38.5 
Population density (per sq km) 121 
1992 1993 1994 
GDP at constant prices (a) 1.5 3.8 
Agricultural production (a) -11.0 1.5 
Industrial production (aJ 4.2 7.9 9.9 
Consumer price index (a) 43.0 353 31.9 
Unemployment rate, in % (b) 13.6 16.l 16.6 
Budget balance,% GDP (c) -6.0 -2.8 
Trade balance, $ bn (d) 0.5 -2.3 -0.3 
Current account. $ bn (d) -0.3 -2.3 -0.4 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (b) 49.9 47.0 
Debt-export ratio, % (c) 357 346 
(a) Percentage change over (the same perio<l of) the previous year. 
(b) End of period. 
(c) Consolidated state budget deficit. accrual basis. 
(d) In convertible currencies. 
latest 
Jan-June 
Jan-June 
June 
Jan-May 
Jan-May 
(e) Gross hard-currency debt as a percentage of hard-currency exports 
(NBP figures). 
Privatization of state enterprises and new private sector activ-
ity have resulted in an increase in the contribution of the pri-
vate sector to total GDP. This rose from 28o/c in 1989 to over 
50% in 1993. However, the recession and the restructuring of 
enterprises have resulted in increased unemployment, which 
rose from negligible levels at the start of 1990 to 16.6% of the 
work-force in June 1994. Moreover, the effects of restructur-
ing have been particularly acute in the many areas that depend 
on single large plants or sectors, and substantial regional vari-
ations in unemployment have emerged. The rate ranges from 
7.5% in Krakow to over 25% in some regions. 
The combination of a fairly restrictive incomes policy and the 
fear of unemployment has limited wage growth, and resulted 
in an overall decline in real wages of about 2% in 1993. The 
government abolished the tax on excessive wages on I April 
1994 with the intention of replacing it with a system of norms 
and widening the scope of the law to include the private sec-
tor. Although the law was approved by parliament, it was re-
jected by the President. The law has since been amended to 
exclude the private sector and has been passed to come into 
effect on I August. In the intervening period, however, real 
wages have grown significantly. 
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The budget for 1993, which formed one of the performance 
criteria of the IMF stand-by loan, was planned to be PLZ 
82 trillion (5.1 % of GDP). Revenues exceeded expecta-
tions during 1993, as the financial condition of state enter-
prises improved. As a result, the deficit in 1993 was lower 
than expected at PLZ 43.8 trillion (2.8% of GDP). The 
1994 budget envisages a deficit of PLZ 83 trillion in 1994. 
This is expected to be about 4.0% of GDP. 
The NBP maintained tight control of the money supply in 
1993, which resulted in a decline of 2% in money supply 
in real terms. The NBP set a limit on Treasury bill pur-
chases of PLZ 30 trillion in 1993 and intends to continue 
this limit in 1994. Despite the more favourable fiscal out-
look, the government has experienced difficulties in fi-
nancing the deficit under its Treasury bill programme. 
Moreover, as the burden of financing the budget is expected 
to be much higher in the second half of the year, it can be 
expected that there will be increasing competition for funds 
over the coming months. This means that yields might rise 
in the second half of the year. Monetary growth is expected 
to be 5% in real terms in 1994, and the target for annual 
inflation is 27%. The unanticipated high monthly inflation 
in recent months, however, means that it is unlikely that this 
target will be achieved. The NBP recently cut interest rates 
by two percentage points to bring the refinancing rate to 
33%. 
The introduction of convertibility and the adoption of a lib-
eral trade regime in 1990 were aimed at importing the world 
price structure and promoting trade with the west. To a large 
extent this strategy has been successful, although in 1991 
the rapid breakdown of CMEA trade, the rise in energy 
prices and the real appreciation of the zloty resulted in a 
weak trade balance. Polish trade data are extremely difficult 
to interpret: NBP data, based on flows of funds, show a 
trade deficit of $2,293m in 1993, while customs data show 
a much bigger deficit. The NBP provide the only up-to-date 
data for 1994, which show a $320m trade deficit for the first 
five months of the year. 
A 'crawling peg' policy has been in operation since Oc-
tober 1991, which was adjusted at the same time as the last 
one-off devaluation in August 1993, from 1.8% to 1.6% per 
month, in line with the reduction in monthly inflation. 
Poland had been unable since 1981 to service fully its exter-
nal debt, which in February 1991 stood at around $48.Sbn, 
of which about $32bn was owed to 17 of the Paris Club of 
government creditors. [n March 1991 Poland reached an 
agreement with the Paris Club, which provided for a reduc-
tion of the net present value of the debt by 50%. The first 
30% reduction was to be achieved by March 1994. In 
March 1993, the IMF agreed to provide Poland with a one-
year stand-by loan. Following the fulfilment of the condi-
tions of this agreement in March 1994, the second debt-re-
duction tranche of 20% became available. The Polish 
government has achieved a similar deal on the $9 .4bn owed 
to commercial banks, plus $2. 7bn of overdue interest. The 
agreement envisages a reduction of 42.5% in the net present 
value of the debt over a 30-year period. Poland has agreed 
a further stand-by loan with the IMF, which will in part be 
used to meet the increased debt servicing entailed by the 
London Club deal. Total foreign debt amounted to $4 7 .0 bn 
at the end of 1993. 
By the end of 1993, 26% of state-owned enterprises had 
been assigned to some form of privatization path, while 
13% of enterprises had actually completed the privatization 
process. After much delay, preparations for the mass pri-
vatization scheme are now under way. Under this scheme 
367 state enterprises, to be managed by 20 National Invest-
ment Funds, are to be transferred to private ownership. Pol-
ish citizens will be able to purchase participation certifi-
cates in the funds with either cash or vouchers. To 
encourage fund managers to maximize the value of the 
companies for which they are to be responsible, they will 
receive both a flat-rate payment and further payment on the 
basis of the enterprises' performance. 
In addition, certain specified groups of state enterprises will 
be given the option to decide upon their prefen-ed privatiz-
ation method and to submit a plan for restructuring. Accept-
able plans will then receive favourable terms for debt resche-
duling, tax arrears and workers' equity and representation. 
Failure to submit a suitable plan will result in commercializ-
ation on less favourable terms. The government intends to set 
up a state property ministry to manage those firms remaining 
in the state sector for the time being. This body will then be 
charged with accelerating the commercialization of the re-
maining 5,300 state enterprises. The government intends to 
play a more active role in the restructuring of industry, paying 
particular attention to the declining steel and mining sectors. 
A two-tier banking system was created, by the removal of 
the 'big 9' state commercial banks from the control of the 
National Bank of Poland. So far two of these have been pri-
vatized. In addition, a liberal licensing policy has resulted 
in the creation of over eighty new private banks. However, 
the big 9 banks continue to manage most commercial 
credit, the large majority of which goes to state enterprises. 
Most of these banks inherited portfolios beset with prob-
lems of bad loans, which have since been exacerbated by 
the recession. The government aims to recapitalize and re-
structure the banks using up to $600m from the Polish Sta-
bilization Fund, along with a $450m Joan from the World 
Bank. The government has also made provision in the 
budget for the recapitalization of the Bank for Food Econ-
omy, but this has been criticized on the grounds that no 
prior restructuring of the bank is envisaged. 
The tax system is being overhauled, with the aim of increas-
ing tax revenues from the rapidly expanding private sector 
and expanding the base to include the shadow economy. Per-
sonal income tax was introduced from 1 January 1992, and 
value-added tax was introduced on 5 July 1993. 
Romania 
The conditions under which Romania embarked on economic 
reform were particularly difficult. The country had no net 
foreign debt, but this was achieved at a substantial human and 
economic cost. During the last years of the Ceaucescu regime 
imports were kept very low; for a decade virtually no western 
machinery was imported. Exports (most notably of agricul-
tural goods) were stimulated, but they were made possible by 
repressed consumption at home. A deliberate policy was fol-
lowed of holding down services and high technology in fa-
vour of heavy industry and manual labour. Moreover, signifi-
cant resources were squandered on prestige projects. As a 
result, Romania's industrial infrastructure is among the most 
backward in Europe, and its work-force is particularly de-
moralized and badly trained. 
The Romanian economy showed a mixed performance in 
1993. After five consecutive years of decline, the authorities' 
estimate indicates that output stabilized. This was partly due 
to stronger-than-expected growth in public consumption and 
exports. However, inflation accelerated during 1993, ~s. a r~-
sult of the elimination of most remaining price subs1d1es m 
May and the introduction of VAT in July. The continuing de-
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preciation of the leu, the large nominal wage increases with-
out corresponding rises in labour productivity, and the lack of 
financial discipline of state enterprises have also served to fuel 
inflationary pressures. Inflation during the first five months of 
1994 stabilized at around 6% per month. Unemployment con-
tinued to rise slowly during the first half of 1993 but has re-
cently stabilized, largely because of increased job creation in 
the private sector. Trade and current account deficits were re-
corded in 1990-92, caused by the disintegration of the CMEA 
and the sharp fall in domestic production. During 1993 further 
trade liberalization resulted in substantial increases in exports 
and imports ( +5.5% and +3.1 % respectively over 1992), and 
in the first five months of 1994 they continued to grow 
(+38.4% and +I0.1% respectively over the same period of 
1993). Official exchange reserves remained at extremely low 
levels throughout 1993 but have gradually increased in 1994. 
Gross foreign debt is low ($4.4bn at end-1993), but is rising 
fast. 
TABLE 11 : ROMANIA - Main Economic Indicators 
Area ('OOO km2) 232 
Population (millions) 22.8 
Population density (per sq km) 98 
1992 1993 1994 
GDP at constant prices (a) -13.6 1.0 
Agricultural production (a) -12.1 14.0 
Industrial production (a) -21.8 1.3 -1.8 
Consumer price index (a) 199.0 295.0 225.9 
Unemployment rate, in % (b) 8.4 10.2 10.8 
Budget balance, % GDP (c) -4.6 -0.1 
Trade balance, $ bn (d) -1.0 -0.7 --0.2 
CmTent account, $ bn (d) -1.5 -1.3 -0.2 
Gross foreign debt, $ bn (b) 3.4 4.4 
Debt-export ratio,% (e) 79 90 
( a) Percentage change over (the same period of) the previous year. 
(b) End of period. 
( c) Consolidated general government budget deficit, accrual basis. 
(d) In convertible currencies. 
latest 
Jan-May 
Jan-May 
June 
Jan-May 
Jan-May 
( e) Gross hard-currency debt as a percentage of hard-currency exports. 
Following long and difficult negotiations, the IMF Board ap-
proved in early June 1994 a 19-month loan agreement worth 
$700m. In return Romania has pledged to reduce annual infla-
tion to two digits by the end of l 994, to speed up privatization 
and state sector restructuring and to maintain internal con-
vertibility of the leu. 
The authorities have opted for a gradual approach to price lib-
eralization and have maintained ad hoe intervention. In early 
May 1993 all remaining subsidies were eliminated, except on 
drugs, rents, public transport and some energy prices, includ-
ing electricity. The wholesale prices of certain key products 
have continued to be administratively controlled, but the gov-
ernment raised energy prices to world levels in mid-1994. 
The consolidated general government deficit for 1993 de-
clined from 4.6% of GDP in 1992 to only 0.1 % in 1993. This 
was achieved through significant reductions in the payment 
of consumer subsidies ( 6% of GDP in 1993 against 13.6% in 
1992), strict control of expenditures, including public sector 
wages, and better than expected revenues from the introduc-
tion of VAT in July 1993. The budget deficit, however, does 
not accurately reflect the country's fiscal position, as extra-
budgetary expenditure remains substantial. The government 
plans to introduce personal income tax in 1994, as well as a 
land tax and increased local and excise taxes. At the same 
time, provisions have been incorporated in the 1994 budget 
for the creation of a social safety net. The Finance Ministry 
and the National Bank of Romania (NBR) have also launched 
the country's first Treasury bill. 
Monetary policy has been tightened considerably since 
mid-1993. The central bank authorities discontinued the fi-
nancing of the central budget deficit, and all preferential 
credits were abolished. The refinancing of the commercial 
banks by the central bank has been carried out by auction 
since August 1993, with commercial banks bidding for 
funds and the possibility of interest rate rises if demand ex-
ceeds supply. The discount rate of the central bank, which 
had risen from 70% in mid-1993 to 170% in early May 
1994, declined to 130% by end-June. These trends reflect 
the reduced need for additional funding by the main com-
mercial banks, which has come about because people are 
now more willing to hold lei, thanks to the attractive in-
terest rates offered to household depositors, and because 
the NBR has raised interest rates for banks' minimum re-
serve deposits from 10% to 30%. The authorities intend to 
achieve and maintain positive real interest rates this year. 
Current-account convertibility for residents was intro-
duced in November 1991. The value of the leu depreciated 
rapidly from early 1992; the authorities repeatedly inter-
vened and attempted to hold the exchange rate at levels 
which were clearly unsustainable in view of the prevailing 
rate of inflation. This resulted in large discounts on the par-
allel market, the build-up oflarge foreign currency deposits 
by exporters and the depletion of official reserves. In April 
the functioning of the foreign exchange auction was sub-
stantially liberalized. A market-clearing mechanism was 
introduced in the foreign exchange auction, and banks are 
now allowed to buy and sell unlimited amounts of foreign 
exchange for their own account in the auction. As a result 
the auction rate has recently converged on rates in the paral-
lel market. The NBR plans to replace the auction with a 
fully fledged inter-bank market in the near future. The de-
preciation of the leu is expected to improve the country's ex-
port performance and achieve a rapid build-up in the foreign 
exchange reserves of the central bank but also to increase 
inflationary pressures. 
Progress towards structural reform has been slow in Romania 
because of the lack of an internal political consensus on the 
reform process and the country's limited institutional and ad-
ministrative capacity. The Parliament approved a new four-
year economic reform programme in March 1993. This pro-
gramme aims to accelerate privatization and the financial 
restructuring of enterprises, promote competition and encour-
age foreign investment. A Restructuring Agency has been set 
up to restructure enterprises in key industrial sectors. Pro-
grammes will be drawn up to redeploy labour and to ease the 
social costs of the adjustment process. 
The privatization process has moved forward at a satisfactory 
pace in small enterprises and in the agricultural sector. By the 
end of 1993, over 50% of retail trade had been privatized. At 
the same time, the number of new private firms has grown 
rapidly, particularly in the service sector. These developments 
are reflected in the increasing contribution of the private sec-
tor to GDP, which was about 32% in 1993. Private sector par-
ticipation in foreign trade activity has also grown rapidly and 
currently accounts for over a quarter of exports and nearly one 
third of imports. 
Privatization of small plots of farmland is nearly complete, 
with 91 % of land in private ownership as of January 1994. 
Following a slow start, almost all of the provisional land 
ownership certificates have now been issued. However, the 
complicated process of restoring plots to their former owners 
and the inflexible legal regime which regulates transactions 
of land holdings resulted in a fragmentation of arable land and 
a drop in land productivity. 
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Some slow progress has been achieved in the privatization of 
large state-owned enterprises. Large privatization is provided 
for in a July 1991 law which envisages the privatization of 
about 6,200 firms, or 55% of state-sector equity, over ten 
years. Implementation of the law, however, has been delayed 
by inter-institutional disputes. About 550 companies had 
been transferred to the private sector by May 1994, account-
ing for only 3% of total state-sector equity. In August the gov-
ernment will publish a list of 3,000 enterprises which are to 
be sold to citizens under a mass privatization scheme. Free 
vouchers were distributed to the public in 1992 entitling 
holders to a 30% share in these firms. The other 70% will be 
held by the state and will be gradually privatized by 1998. 
Two of the five major state-owned banks are being prepared 
for privatization in 1995. 
Little has been done to restructure the state-owned industrial 
sector, although activity has picked up in recent months. A 
pilot programme is under way, whereby thirty of these enter -
prises have been isolated from the banking system and plans 
for their restructuring have begun to be implemented, includ-
ing the liquidation of three seriously troubled companies. 
However, there is no timetable for the completion of the pilot 
programme and the process so far has been cumbersome and 
slow. The Ministry of Finance has shortlisted another 25 loss-
making state-owned enterprises which are to undergo emerg-
ency restructuring procedures during 1994. Furthermore, 200 
enterprises have been identified for rehabilitation and placed 
under the surveillance of the Restructuring Agency; their re-
structuring programmes are to be drafted by October 1994. 
The authorities' failure to impose financial discipline on in-
dustry and the lack of a legislative framework governing en-
terprise behaviour have meant that most fums have not 
adapted to market conditions. The government intends to pass 
a new bankruptcy law by mid-August 1994. In the mean time 
a small number of state-owned enterprises has been declared 
financially insolvent in order to prevent them from accumu-
lating further inter-enterprise arrears and so as to allow credi-
tors to open legal proceedings and recover part of their debts. 
Financial markets have also been slow to emerge in Romania; 
the passage of the long-awaited securities and exchange law 
by the lower house of the Romanian parliament opens the 
way to the setting up of a stock exchange in Bucharest, cur-
rently expected for November 1994. 
A fairly liberal framework law on foreign direct investment 
was approved in April 1991. It allows wholly foreign-owned 
companies to be set up in all sectors of the economy, and 
grants significant tax and import duty relief to investors; all 
profits may be repatriated in hard currency after the payment 
of a I 0% tax. Foreign investments are granted full protection 
by the constitution, but the Parliament rejected draft legisla-
tion which would have allowed foreigners to buy land. Flows 
of direct foreign investment into Romania fell from $269m in 
1992 to $217m in 1993. 
Slovak Republic 
The Slovak Republic has had to face the difficult tasks of 
building a market economy and, at the same time, establish-
ing the institutions of an independent state. Indeed, the pro-
cess of separation considerably complicated Slovakia's econ-
omic difficulties. Political instability and the lack of a broad 
social consensus on the path of economic reform presented 
additional obstacles to the transformation process. Also, the 
termination of fiscal transfers from the Czech Republic (tenta-
tively estimated at 7 per cent of Slovak GDP in 1992) un-
masked a large underlying fiscal and external imbalance. 
In 1993 all key indicators of economic activity on the supply 
side, as well as most key demand-side indicators, showed a 
continued downturn in the Slovak economy, and rising finan-
cial imbalances towards the end of the year. Monthly inflation 
came down to less than 2 per cent, despite a surge at the begin-
ning of 1993 caused by the introduction of a new tax system, 
and a second - smaller - surge in the autumn in the wake of 
an increase in VAT rates and of the 10% devaluation of the 
Slovak crown in July. The budget deficit was kept under con-
trol from the middle of the year, although some deterioration 
occurred late in the year, when social expenditures were in-
creased and revenue collection fell short of expectations, par-
tially as a result of fast-growing tax arrears. For the whole year 
the deficit reached about 7.5 per cent of GDP. This result was 
obtained in a context of high unemployment and without any 
fiscal transfer from the Czech Republic. 
From early 1993 the weak balance-of-payments situation, 
continuing recession, and a large budget deficit were issues of 
major concern. By mid-1993, given the already tight macro-
economic stance, actions directly targeted at improving the 
external balance were warranted. After devaluing the 
currency against all other currencies by 10 per cent in July 
1993, and against the clearing ECU used for bilateral Czech-
Slovak balance-of-payments transactions, by 5 per cent in De-
cember 1993, the Slovak authorities decided to impose an im-
port surcharge of I O per cent on most consumer goods and 
foodstuffs in March 1994. 
Despite a sharp compression of domestic demand and the de-
valuations of the Slovak crown, total trade and current ac-
count deficits in 1993 reached US$ 915 m (9% of GDP) and 
US$ 432 m (4.2% of GDP). The trade and current account 
balances suffered a sharp deterioration in the final months of 
the year; indeed, more than 50% of the 1993 trade deficit and 
all of the current account deficit were produced in the last 
quarter of 1993 alone. 
TABLE 12: SLOVAK REPUBLIC- Main Economic Indicators 
Area ('OOO km2) 49 
Population (millions) 
Population density (per sq km) 
GDP at constant prices (a) 
Agricultural production (a) 
Industrial production (a) 
Consumer price index (a) 
Unemployment rate, in% (b) 
Budget balance,% GDP (c) 
Trade balance.$ bn (d) 
Current account.$ bn (d) 
Gross foreign debt,$ bn (b) 
Debt-export ratio, % ( e) 
1992 
-6 
-12 
-13 
9 
1 
-4 
-0.2(g) 
0.2(f) 
9.5(f) 
84(0 
5.3 
108 
1993 
-4 
-7 
-14 
23 
14 
-7.5 
-0.9 
-0.4 
3.4 
63 
1994 
3.6 
3 
13.9 
13.9 
0.1 
-0.1 
0.1 
(a) Percentage change over (the same period oD the previous year. 
(b) End of period. 
(c) Consolidated state budget deficit, accrual basis. 
(d) In convertible currencies. 
latest 
QI 
Feb 
May 
May 
HI 
Jan-May 
Jan-Apr 
(e) Gross hard-currency debt as a percentage of hard-currency exports. 
( f) Refers to CSFR. 
(g) Excludes trade with Czech Republic. 
Until mid-1994 Slovakia had serious trouble financing the 
current account deficit. Net foreign direct investment. 
amounting to US$ 134 m in 1993, continued to be of little sig-
nificance. In addition, Slovakia lacked ready access to the in-
ternational capital markets, partly because, unlike the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia could no longer benefit from the solid in-
ternational economic reputation that the federal government 
had built since the beginning of the reforms. Finally, specula-
tion about a devaluation of the Slovak crown had resulted, 
both in the first half of 1993 and at the tum of the year, in a 
significant outflow of short-term capital. 
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To help ease the balance-of-payments constraint, the IMF 
lent Slovakia SDR 64.35 m (US$ 89 m) under the Systemic 
Transformation Facility (STF) in July 1993. In April 1994 
the IMF reached agreement with the Slovak authorities on an 
economic policy programme that could be supported in the 
corning months by a stand-by arrangement, mobilizing up to 
US$ 460 m, and, possibly, a second purchase from the STF. 
In addition, the World Bank approved in November 1993 a 
US$ 80 m Economic Recovery Loan. 
Since March 1994, the external performance of the Slovak 
economy has been improving considerably. Data for the first 
four months of the year show a trade deficit of only US$ 117 
m and the current account in surplus by US$ 54 m, reflecting 
lower imports from the Czech Republic and rising exports to 
western countries. The main factors behind this improvement 
seem to be continuing weakness of domestic demand ( despite 
some recent signs of revival), the devaluations of the Slovak 
crown last year, and the import surcharge. 
Domestic economic indicators have also become more fa-
vourable. GDP in the first quarter recovered significantly if 
compared to the first quarter of last year, when the trough of 
the economic downturn was reached, but it was still below the 
level of last spring and summer. Nevertheless, output seems 
to be about to stabilize, inflation has come down to less than 
10 per cent at an annualized rate, and the budget is showing 
the first surplus since independence. Finally, unemployment 
seems also to be about to stabilize, although at a high level. 
Slovakia has made progress towards establishing the institu-
tional framework of a market economy. Prices and trade were 
liberalized at the outset of the transformation process, and cur-
rent-account convertibility of the domestic currency was es-
tablished. Since then large parts of state-owned property have 
been privatized, the tax system and the system of social secur-
ity contributions and benefits have been brought into line with 
western standards, and the legislation necessary for efficient 
decentralized economic decision-making has been put in 
place. However, most of these achievements in the transform-
ation process were the results of reforms undertaken by the 
federal government of Czechoslovakia between 1990 and 
1992, before the split of the country. From then until March 
1994, little was done to advance the transformation process. 
The lack of financial resources was said to be the major, if not 
the only, obstacle to the process of restructuring the economy. 
Enterprises were and are still entangled in the problem of the 
insolvency of clients. Banks' capacity to provide new credits 
has also been very limited because of the large share of "bad 
debts" in their portfolios, and tight monetary and fiscal po-
licies. 
The new coalition government formed in late March 1994 
has adopted a comprehensive stabilization and reform pro-
gramme for 1994-95 to reinforce and complete the process 
of adjusting to the loss of fiscal transfers from the Czech 
Republic, and to accelerate the process of structural reform 
that had been slowed down considerably following inde-
pendence. The programme, which is supported by an TMF 
arrangement, complementary assistance from the 
EU/G-24, and World Bank operations, extends far beyond 
the parliamentary elections set for end-September 1994, 
though it specifically includes important immediate ac-
tions in the area of structural reform that are aimed at mak-
ing the process irreversible. Core elements of the pro-
gramme are the amendment of the state budget to limit the 
deficit to 4 per cent of GDP in 1994, and the launching of 
a second wave of voucher privatization. 
Slovenia 
Although Slovenia has been spared the heavy damage in-
flicted on other parts of ex-Yugoslavia by the civil war, the re-
sulting economic dislocation and in particular the dramatic re-
duction of trade with the former Yugoslav republics have 
accentuated existing production and supply problems. Since 
independence in October 1991, Slovenia has managed to sta-
bilize its economy to a considerable extent. However, the 
positive results of stabilization, which are reflected in the sig-
nificantly reduced inflation rate, were accompanied by a sharp 
decline in output, increased unemployment and serious diffi-
culties in the financial sector. 
After having stagnated for more than a decade, GDP fell dur-
ing 1989-92. Output grew modestly in 1993. Some domestic 
demand components grew significantly in 1993, particularly 
private consumption, which rose by more than I 0% over 
1992, and gross fixed investment, which turned positive for 
the first time in seven years. Further evidence of recovery has 
been provided by the steep rise in industrial production, 
which rose by 5.8% in the first five months of 1994 over the 
same period of 1993, thus ending the decline that began in 
1989. Real wages also moved sharply upwards during the 
first half of 1994. The current account surplus, which had 
been a constant feature of the Slovenian economy in recent 
years, declined significantly in 1993. The trade balance 
moved into deficit from the previous year's surplus. 
Monetary stabilization has been successful: the monthly 
inflation rate declined to single digits by April 1992; prices 
rose by 32.3% in 1993 over 1992, the lowest figure in the past 
eleven years. This trend continued during the first six months 
of 1994. Slovenia had traditionally been a full-employment 
society, but the number of registered unemployed rose sharply 
from early 1991 until it stabilized in early 1994. Most job 
losses have occurred in the socially owned enterprise sector; 
employment has risen in the government sector and particu-
larly in the private sector. 
TABLE 13 : SLOVENIA- Main Economic Indicators 
Area ('000 km2) 20 
Population (millions) 2 
Population density (per sq km) 100 
1992 1993 1994 
GDP at constant prices (a) -6.5 1.0 
Agricultural production (a) -17.0 
Industrial production (a) -13.2 -2.8 5.8 
Consumer price index (a) 201.0 32.3 20.5 
Unemployment rate, in% (b) 13.3 15.4 14.6 
Budget balance. % GDP (b) 0.6 0.5 
Trade balance, $ bn (c) 0.1 -0.4 -0.1 
Current account. $ bn (c) 0.9 0.2 0.2 
Gross foreign debt. $ bn (b) 1.8 1.9 
Debt-export ratio. % (d) 26 31 
(a) Percentage change over (the same period of) the prcviou-; year. 
(b) End of period. 
(c) In convertible currencies. 
latest 
Jan-May 
Jan-June 
Apr 
Jan-May 
Jan-May 
id) Gross hard-currency debt as a percentage of hard-currency exports. 
Trading activity has contracted because of the disintegration 
of the Yugoslav federation and the collapse of the CMEA. 
However, exporters have succeeded in finding new markets 
in the West. Imports have also risen strongly, particularly of 
consumer goods and equipment, fuelled by high real wage in-
creases. The invisibles balance suffered in 199 I because of 
the drop in receipts from tourism and emigrants' remittances, 
though it picked up again in 1992 and 1 993. Foreign ex -
change reserves rose rapidly during the first year of indepen-
dence and stood at about $1.9bn by May 1994. 
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The cornerstone of Slovenia's economic stabilization pro-
gramme has been the implementation of a tight monetary 
policy through the maintenance of high real interest rates, al-
though the Bank of Slovenia has been under pressure from the 
government since early 1994 to reduce rates. This policy has 
succeeded in drastically reducing inflation, but at the cost of 
sharp declines in output. Inflationary impulses last year came 
from exchange rate depreciation and increases in govern-
ment-controlled prices. However, the main threat to price sta-
bility came from the centralized and rigid wage-setting pro-
cess: the wage structure was indexed on the minimum wage, 
which was negotiated monthly between the authorities and 
the trade unions. Following lengthy negotiations, a new 
agreement among all social partners was signed in April 1994 
which entails a decline in real wages for one year. The agree-
ment was enshrined in law in order to ensure implementation. 
Fiscal policy has been prudent. Public expenditures grew 
strongly in 1993, mostly to accommodate the high costs of 
enterprise and bank rehabilitation and to cover the costs of ris-
ing unemployment benefits and improved social services. 
The rise in revenues in 1993 was less than expected because 
of the output losses and the shift from a pay-roll tax to a per-
sonal income tax, which has increased the scope for tax evas-
ion. Nonetheless, the budget showed a small surplus. During 
the first half of 1994 expenditures fell by 2% compared with 
the same period of 1993, thanks to lower capital expenditures 
and decreased payments for consumer subsidies. At the same 
time the stronger economic growth recorded in the first half 
of 1994 and rising real wages have resulted in a steep increase 
in state revenues for this period (8% ). The personal income 
tax regime will be amended in 1994 so as to ensure a fairer 
distribution of the tax burden among the population. A new 
property tax will be introduced in 1994 and a value-added tax 
in 1995. 
Since independence the parliament has adopted legislation 
which has liberalized prices, deregulated the banking sector 
and liberalized foreign exchange operations. Government 
price controls are still applied on a few basic foodstuffs and 
public services, as well as on electricity and petrol; their prices 
are increased periodically. Budget subsidies are provided for 
a limited number of foodstuffs and public services, amount-
ing to about 2% of total budget expenditure. 
Slovenia introduced its own currency, the tollar, in October 
1991. Currently the central bank targets a specific rate for 
the tollar against the DM and intervenes in the market to 
maintain this rate. Full convertibility for current account 
transactions was achieved in early 1992. Some exchange 
controls remain on capital account transactions. 
Since mid-1993 the authorities have given priority to the fi-
nancial restructuring of state-owned industry. Enterprise 
losses and insolvencies increased dramatically during the 
first nine months of 1991, as a result both of market reforms 
and of external shocks, such as the collapse of the ex-Yugo-
slav market. In response the authorities pre-empted bank-
ruptcy by declaring a moratorium on bankruptcy proceed-
ings in September 1991. Since then the position of many 
enterprises has deteriorated further, and they have accumu-
lated huge bad debts to the domestic banking system. Be-
cause the government feared that a lifting of the mora-
torium would trigger a chain of bankruptcies, it launched 
a restructuring project for the most distressed companies. A 
Development Fund was set up which provides emergency sta-
bilization funding to enterprises that are salvageable or initi-
ates winding-up procedures for those that have no realistic 
prospects of survival. The main problem faced by the Fund 
is the limited financial resources available for its operations. 
A primary objective of the government has been to encour-
age private sector development through legal reforms and 
the introduction of a regulatory framework. The most im-
portant pieces of reform legislation, enacted in 1993, in-
clude the Competition Law, the Company Law, the Law on 
Auditing and the Law on Security Markets. A new bank-
ruptcy law came into force in March I 994. Accounting 
standards have also been introduced. 
Progress towards privatization has been rather slow. Laws on 
the restitution of previously nationalized and confiscated 
property have been enacted. In the housing sector well over 
a third of the socially owned apartments had been sold to pri-
vate owners by early 1993. In agriculture a law on fann coop-
eratives was enacted in early 1992, providing for the de-
nationalization of farmland and forests. However, its 
implementation has been delayed by disputes over the restitu-
tion of land to former owners and to the church. 
Following nearly two years of debate in Parliament, the Law 
on Ownership Transformation of Enterprises was passed in 
November 1992. A total of 2,200 socially owned enterprises 
are due to be converted into share-holding companies by 
end-1995. The law provides for a combination of free dis-
tribution to citizens and employees with commercial privatiz-
ation of enterprises. All citizens of Slovenia were given free 
non-transferable certificates (equivalent to 40% of the total 
social capital of all the enterprises), which they can use to buy 
shares in companies or in investment trusts. The authorities 
can sell either a whole enterprise or a controlling interest. 
Foreign direct investment in Slovenia is currently character-
ized by a large number of projects of low individual value, 
concentrated mostly in the service sector and aimed at 
marketing foreign goods and services; few investments are 
aimed at the creation of new productive facilities. The only 
investment restrictions apply to foreign ownership of land. 
Foreign direct investment flows amounted to$ 112m in I 993, 
almost exactly the same level as in the previous year. The gov-
ernment has presented a new law on foreign investment to 
Parliament. 
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Principal economic policy measures - July 1994 
Community (EUR-12) 
11. 7. EcoFin Council adopts its recommendation on the Broad Economic 
Policy Guide! ines of the Member States and of the Community. 
Belgium (B) 
13. 7. The central bank reduces its official rates, cutting its central rate and the 
rate on advances within the ceiling by 0.05 percentage point to 4.90% and 
6.40% respectively. 
22. 7. The central bank reduces its official rates, cutting its central rate and the 
rate on advances within the ceiling by 0.05 percentage point to 4.85% and 
6.35% respectively. 
24. 7. The government adopts the draft budget for 1995, which envisages rev-
enue of BFR 1424.8 billion (up 2.7%) and expenditure of BFR 1695.9 billion 
(up 1.2% ). giving a budget deficit of BFR 271.1 billion, i.e. 4.3% of GDP. The 
Finance Council estimated that BFR 70 billion needed to be saved at Federal 
level. In order to achieve this, the government has increased the budgeted pro-
ceeds from asset sales in 1995 from BFR 10 billion to BFR 13.5 billion, re-
duced primary Federal expenditure to the maximum extent possible 
(BPR 20 billion) and pruned BFR 3.7 billion off the social security budget. In 
the light of a 14% increase in the first six months of the year, it has also revised 
upward to 10.4% the growth of tax revenue for 1994. ln 1995 tax revenue is 
projected to rise by 6%. Primary expenditure such as interest charges should 
stabilize or even diminish in real tenns. Lastly. on the social security front, sav-
ings of BFR 3.7 billion have been necessary so that the !NAM! spending al-
location ofBFR 402.8 billion is not overshot. The purpose of these measures is 
to exercise tighter control over health expenditure. 
Denmark (DK) 
7. 7. The Danish central bank reduces its I 4-day repurchase rate on govern-
ment paper by O. Hl%, to 5.50%. 
Germany (D) 
None. 
Greece (GR) 
5. 7. The Bank of Greece decides to pay 9% interest on half the commercial 
banks' reserve requirements, which previously had earned no interest at all. 
This is a retrospective measure covering the period I January to 30 June 1994. 
11.7. The Bank of Greece abolishes the commercial banks' overdraft daily 
penalty rate of 0. I%. 
15.7. The government raises the 12-month Treasury bill rate by 175 basis 
points, to 20.25%. 
Spain (E) 
15-22. 7. The Spanish government approves the revision of the Spanish con-
vergence programme ( I 994-97). Economic targets for 1994 are unchanged. 
GDP is projected to grow by 2.8% in 1995 and by 3.9% in 1996-97. The gen-
eral government deficit is budgeted to fa 11 from 6.7% of GDP in 1994 to 5.9% 
in 1995, 4.4% in 1996 and 3% in the following year. 
France (F) 
30.6. The upper limit permitted on CO DEV! (subsidized saving accounts) is 
raised from FF 20 OOO to FF 30 OOO. 
30.6. The Banque de France cuts its intervention rate from 5.2% to 5.1 o/c. 
I. 7. Exemptions from death duties and ownership transfer duties on residen-
tial construction are extended to the end of 1994. 
1.7. Minimum wage (SMIC) up by 2.1 %, to FF 6 006.64 from I July. 
4. 7. An amount of FF 15 billion will be allocated to CEPME (Credit d'E-
quipement aux Petites et Moyennes Entreprises) in the period 1994-97 to fi-
nance SME investment at a low interest rate. 
28.7. The Banque de France cuts its intervention rate from 5.1 o/c· to 5'7c. 
Ireland (IRL) 
None. 
Italy (I) 
21.7. The government approves the medium-term financial and economic 
plan (Documento di Programmazione Economica e 1-'inanziaria - DPEF) for 
the years 1995-97. This document sets the general public finance objectives 
for the next three years, although it does not include the specific measures by 
which they are to be achieved. The objectives set by the DPEF and the frame-
work for government action can be summarized as follows: 
- a small adjustment is planned for the present year. An amnesty on construc-
tion abuses, subject to the payment of a fee. and cuts in social security expendi-
ture, still to be specified. should reduce the deficit from 9.7% to 9.4% of GDP; 
- an adjustment equivalent to 2.6% of GDP is aimed for in 1995 to cut the 
deficit from an estimated 10.7% to 8.1 %. This should be achieved thanks to 
extra revenue of LIT 18 trillion and expenditure cuts of LIT 27 trillion. The 
exra revenue should come mainly from an administrative reform to deal with 
cases of tax evasion which are coming to light and to settle past disputes be-
tween taxpayers and the tax authorities. The Minister for Finance expects these 
reforms to yield some LIT 11 trillion next year. The expenditure cuts of 
LIT 27 trillion should come mainly from a reform of the national health service 
and the social security system; 
- further fiscal packages of the order of 1.8% of GDP are planned for 1996 
and 1997. 
Luxembourg (L) 
None. 
Netherlands (NL) 
14.7. The Nederlandsche Bank decides to reduce its rate on special advances 
by 0.10 percentage point to 4.80% with effect from 15 July 1994. 
Portugal (P) 
27. 7. The Bank of Portugal reduces its money market intervention rate b1 
0.5 point. It also reduces the nine-day bond rate from 11 % to 10.5% and the rate 
for advances on securities from 13.5% to 13% for a 24-hour allocation of 
ESC 100 billion. 
United Kingdom (UK) 
None. 
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